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SELECTED OIL AND GAS DECISIONS 
 
Upstream – Federal  
 
6th Circuit 
 
Eclipse Resources-Ohio, LLC v. Madzia, No. 17-3145, 2017 WL 5903351 
(6th Cir. Nov. 20, 2017). 
 
Lessor entered into and oil and gas lease with Lessee, which was later 
assigned to Assignee. Upon assignment, Lessor and Assignee amended the 
lease to mandate compliance with all laws, to require prompt delivery of 
documents and other instruments and to take action reasonably necessary to 
carry out the amendment, and to include a pooling provision. Subsequently, 
the parties entered into another agreement which granted Assignee a 
subsurface easement on Lessor’s tract. Two sets of wells were at issue: one 
set was located on Lessor’s property and a second set was located nearby. 
Assignee originally sought declaratory judgment entitling it to drill the 
second set of wells from Lessor’s property. Lessor counterclaimed asserting 
numerous claims, all of which were dismissed by the district court except 
for the breach of the covenant of good-faith claim. Consequently, the 
district court found it appropriate for Assignee to drill the second set of 
wells through Lessor’s property based upon the lease and amendments. On 
appeal, the court considered whether the district court erred in determining 
that Assignee had the right to drill the second set of wells from Lessor’s 
property, whether it erred in granting summary judgment against Lessor for 
his breach of contract claim, and whether it erred in granting summary 
judgment against Lessor that Assignee did not breach the covenant of good-
faith. The court affirmed the district court’s ruling, holding that the lease, 
unmodified by the easement agreement, unambiguously granted Assignee 
the right to drill the second set of wells from Lessor’s property. 
Additionally, the court held the lease and amendments were not breached 
by failure to comply with all applicable laws and agreed that Assignee did 
not breach the covenant of good-faith. This case is an unpublished opinion 
of the court; therefore, federal court rules should be consulted before citing 
the case as precedent.  
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9th Circuit  
 
Energy Invs., Inc. v. Greehey & Co., Ltd., 705 Fed. Appx. 655 (Mem) 
(9th Cir. 2017).  
 
After the district court found that the Area of Mutual Interest Agreement 
(“AMI”) unambiguously required Company-1 to pay Company-2 prospect 
fees for mineral acreage acquired by Company-1 or its agents, Company-
1 appealed, arguing that the AMI for oil and gas leases contained a latent 
ambiguity because it did not contain language stating Company-1 had to 
pay Company-2 a prospect fee for shale prospects, nor did it describe the 
circumstances under which a fee must be paid. However, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals found that the contract defined a prospect fee to mean “[a] 
fee of $50.00 per net mineral acre for all Oil and Gas Interest acquired 
by [Company-1] or [a Company-1] subsidiary during the terms of this 
Agreement, payable to [Company-2] subject to the terms of this 
Agreement.” It reasoned that the language of this provision was 
“reasonably susceptible to only one construction” and that Company-1 had 
to pay Company-2 $50.00 for each net mineral acre that was acquired 
by Company-1 or its subsidiary during the term of the AMI, even 
if Company-2 did not contribute to securing the lease. This is an 
unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, federal court rules should be 
consulted before citing the case as precedent.  
 
D. New Mexico 
XTO Energy v. Furth, Case No. 15 CV 1180 JAP/KK, 2017 WL 5891740 
(D.N.M. Nov. 11, 2017). 
Lessee obtained a federal oil and gas lease. Lessee assigned the lease to 
Assignee but reserved for himself a production payment. The payment 
consisted of a limit of $920,000.00. The payment came from five percent of 
the market value of the oil and gas produced. When Lessee died, the 
interest became the property of his wife, and upon her passing became 
property of a Trust established to benefit Wife’s daughters. In 2002, 
Company obtained the lease and started making payments to the Trust. In 
2014 payments stopped because of the realization that the Trust had been 
overpaid. In order for a Company to prevail in an unjust enrichment 
Company must show that Trust knowingly benefited at Company’s 
“expense and that it would be unjust for [the Trust] to retain the benefit.” 
When Company obtained the lease, the Assignee had already paid the trust 
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$468,643.44 leaving $451,356.56 of remaining interest. Trust makes the 
argument that Company negligently failed to check the payments it was 
required to make and that because it overpaid because of its own actions it 
is not required to receive restitution. The court denied both parties motion 
for summary judgment because although Company had a valid claim for 
restitution, denial was appropriate on the grounds of equity and it failed to 
provide sufficient evidence to support the motion.  
 
E.D. Oklahoma  
 
Chieftain Royalty Co. v. B.P. Am. Prod. Co., No. 16-CV-444-JHP, 2017 
WL 5012586 (E.D. Okla. Nov. 2, 2017). 
 
Royalty Owners, as a class, sued Producer for breach of its express duties to 
pay royalties on fuel gas. Royalty Owners claimed that Producer knowingly 
underpaid royalties by not paying royalties on fuel gas and failed to disclose 
the practice to Royalty Owners. Royalty Owners sought to recover owed 
royalties and brought claims for: (1) breach of contract; (2) tortious breach 
of contract; (3) unjust enrichment; (4) fraud and deceit; (5) an accounting; 
and (6) an injunction. Producer sought to dismiss all claims due to issue 
preclusion. First, the court allowed breach of contract claim because 
Royalty Owners included specific allegations about the express lease terms 
and were not required to attach all the leases. Second, the court dismissed 
Royalty Owners’ claim for tortious breach of contract because requisites 
were not met, and courts are reluctant to expand the required “special 
relationship” to oil and gas leases. Third, Producer unsuccessfully argued 
the unjust enrichment claim should be dismissed because there is an 
adequate remedy for the alleged breach of contract. Fourth, the court denied 
Producer’s motion to dismiss the fraud and deceit claims because the 
allegations were sufficiently particular for such claims, Royalty Owners 
were not required by Oklahoma law to request royalty information from 
Producer, and violation of Oklahoma’s reporting requirements was an 
adequate basis for a fraud claim. Finally, the court denied Producers’ 
motion to deny an accounting and an injunction because Royalty Owners 
sufficiently pleaded a request for equitable relief.  
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N.D. Ohio 
 
Lutz v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No. 4:09-cv-2256, 2017 WL4810703 
(N.D. Ohio Oct. 25, 2017).  
  
Lessors claimed that their leases, which provided that Lessee pay them a 
royalty equal to one-eighth the value of the gas produced each month, 
were breached when Lessee began to deliberately and fraudulently 
underpay the full gas royalty in the name of post-production cost 
deductions. They further alleged that, although the gas wells at issue 
produced oil in addition to gas, no oil royalties were ever paid. At issue was 
whether the "at the well" rule, which Lessee argued in favor of, applied or 
the "marketable product" rule, which Lessors argued in favor of, applied. 
The court concluded that the Ohio Supreme Court would adopt the "at the 
well rule" in favor of Lessee, which advocated a simple application of the 
clear and unambiguous language of the leases. The court reasoned that the 
issue could be put in terms of where the gas was to be valued for purposes 
of determining plaintiff's royalty payments. Thus, it understood the use of 
the language "market value at the well" in the royalty 
provision to identify the location at which the gas was valued for purposes 
of calculating Lessors' royalties. Construing the lease under the "marketable 
product" rule would ignore the clear language that royalties are to be paid 
based on "market value at the well."  
 
N.D. Oklahoma  
 
Petroflow Energy Corp. v. Sezar Energy, L.P., No. 16-CV-700-TCK-JFK, 
2017 WL 4399193 (N.D. Okla. Oct. 3, 2017). 
 
Operator-1 and Operator-2 entered into an agreement to exchange working 
interests and jointly develop wells and infrastructure in an area of mutual 
interest. The parties later disputed the meaning of certain terms and 
provisions in the agreement. Operator-1 filed suit in state court for breach 
of contract based upon the disputed terms of the agreement; Operator-2 
removed to federal court based upon diversity jurisdiction. Both parties 
then moved for summary judgment on Operator-1’s breach of contract 
claim and each’s own affirmative defenses of failure of consideration. 
Additionally, Operator-1 moved for partial summary judgment regarding 
certain arguments and defenses made by Operator-2. The court denied 
Operator-2’s motion because, after reviewing the plain language of the 
agreement, it found that Operator-2 did not show that Operator-1’s breach 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
1220 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 3 
  
 
of contract claim failed as a matter of law. Additionally, regarding the 
affirmative defense of failure of consideration, the court found that 
Operator-2 was not entitled to rescind the contract for lack of consideration. 
Next, the court reviewed Operator-1’s motion for partial summary 
judgment in which they sought to preclude Operator-2 from asserting five 
different defenses or arguments. The defenses all dealt with the 
interpretation of the specific agreement between the parties. After analysis, 
the court granted Operator-1’s motion for partial summary judgement.  
 
N.D. West Virginia  
 
Bezilla v. Tug Hill Operating, LLC, No. 5:17CV123 (STAMPT), 2017 WL 
5297941 (N.D.W. Va. Nov. 13, 2017). 
 
Landowner sued Lessee for breach of an oil and gas lease and for trespass 
on his land. Lessee filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, 
asserting that Landowner sought to terminate the lease without the consent 
of his mineral interest cotenants. Landowner argued that the cotenants’ 
consent is not required because his property rights are separate from the 
rights of his cotenants. The district court granted Lessees motion to dismiss. 
The court rejected Landowner’s argument, finding that the mineral interest 
was leased jointly with the other mineral owners; therefore, Landowner 
could not seek to unilaterally terminate the lease without the consent of his 
cotenants. 
 
S.D. Ohio 
 
Crothers v. Statoil USA Onshore Props., Inc., No. 2:16-cv-261, 2017 WL 
6035232 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 6, 2017). 
 
Landowners sued Operators, alleging that Operators’ activities near their 
home caused physical damage to their home’s foundation and a diminution 
in property value. Landowners also charged Operators with interfering with 
the use and enjoyment of their land via noise, light and air pollution, and 
substantial inconvenience and mental anguish. Landowners claimed that 
Operators operated a well in certain proximity of their home and their barn 
in violation of an agreement between Operators and a prior owner. Operator 
moved for summary judgment, and the lower court granted Operator’s 
motion on all claims except for the nuisance claim. The court found that 
Landowners did not legally own the land – instead, it was under one of their 
father’s name. Nevertheless, the court ruled that Landowners could still 
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pursue their nuisance allegations claiming interference with their daily use 
of the property due to loud noises, vibrations, dust, and light pollution. 
Landowners subsequently moved for summary judgment on the nuisance 
claim, asserting that they have more than enough legal interest as long term 
occupants of the subject residence to pursue their nuisance claims. The 
court held that Landowners’ lawsuit against a hydraulic fracturing operator 
could proceed because they have a right to occupy their property free of 
nuisance and further held that Landowners had standing for their claim 
despite the frac-well being on property owned by someone else. 
 
W.D. Louisiana  
 
Magee v. BHP Billiton Petroleum Props. (N.A.), L.P., No. 15-2097, 2017 
WL 5472521 (W.D. La. Nov. 13, 2017). 
  
Lessee sued Operator, seeking royalties, damages for nonpayment of 
royalties, additional bonus payments, and accounting for the relevant wells. 
The leases between Lessee and Operator contained language that allowed 
Operator to remain free from default on royalty payments until thirty days 
after any suit, claim, dispute or question has been entirely resolved. 
Additional language in the leases provided that Operator would pay Lessee 
an additional consideration of $4,975.00 per net mineral acre if Lessee 
successfully establish that the Mineral Servitude expired prior to each 
lease’s granting period. Under a ruling by the district court and affirmed by 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Lessee was found to be due unpaid 
balances on the bonuses with interest. After Operator failed to pay the 
prescribed payments due, Lessee mailed Operator a copy of the Second 
Circuit’s judgment and, thereafter, Operator paid Lessee the full amount 
due. Citing state law, the district court found that Operator did not violate 
the lease by withholding the payment because Lessee was not found to be 
in strict compliance in providing the requisite documents in order to 
provide the required certified proof. Because the leases states that specific 
parties must furnish the certified copy of judgment disposing of the 
previous suit, the court held Lessee did not meet the strict compliance 
required by having a third-party to the original leases send Operator the 
required documents. Because Lessee and Operator entered into agreement 
that discovery for the amount of royalties due was incomplete, the court 
held Lessee’s order of accounting to be premature. The court dismissed 
Lessee’s additional claim for legal interest on the bonus payment as the 
payment was not due until Operator received the requisite documents. 
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Upstream – State  
 
Illinois  
 
Ramsey Herndon, LLC v. Whiteside, 2017 IL 121668. 
  
Operator sued Partner when it learned that Partner had extracted oil from 
Lessor’s property without paying Operator its overriding royalty interest 
(“ORRI”). Partner claimed that the Assignment signed by Operator 
assigning Partner “all of [their] right, title and interest in and to the oil, gas 
and mineral leases . . . together with a like interest in and to all personal 
property located therein” included the ORRI originally held by Operator. 
Operator claimed that because paragraph six of the Assignment read that 
the Partner’s interest shall “bear its proportionate share of . . . [ORRI] there 
must be some [ORRI] that for [Partner] to pay.” The Illinois Supreme Court 
found that the language of the contract was unambiguous, and Operator had 
willingly conveyed “all” of its interest in the estate, including the ORRI. 
Therefore, paragraph six functioned to show that an ORRI still exists, but 
Operator had conveyed it to Partner. Therefore, Partner still must pay the 
owner of that interest the ORRI. However, since Partner owns the ORRI, 
this is not strictly necessary. Because the Assignment did not contain any 
reservation clauses found in other contracts, Operator’s entire interest was 
conveyed by the instrument, and Partner owes Operator no ORRI payments. 
 
Kansas  
 
G & B Mining, LLC v. Schemm, 404 P.3d 701 (Table) (Kan. Ct. App. 
2017). 
 
Landowner owned all surface rights and one-half of the mineral rights to 
the land at issue. A previous owner conveyed the other half of the mineral 
rights to Joint Mineral Owner (“Owner”) through a mineral deed. Based on 
the mineral deed, Owner also claimed ownership of one-fourth of 
Landowner’s mineral rights. Owner sued to recover possession of the 
mineral interest and/or to eject Landowners from the portion of land to 
which Owner claimed mineral rights. They further sought to “quiet title in 
themselves of their interest.” The trial court dismissed Owner’s claims for 
failure to prosecute; all claims were dismissed with prejudice except for the 
partition claim. Subsequently, Owner again sued seeking the partition he 
previously requested. This request was again dismissed for failure to state a 
claim and Owner appealed. The appellate court found that no new evidence 
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or facts had been presented by Owner since his first petition for partition 
and held that since Owner had not addressed the grounds for the district 
court's dismissal nor shown error in the previous judgments, the judgment 
was presumed valid and should be affirmed. 
 
Louisiana  
 
Suire v. Oleum Operating Co., 2017-117 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/21/17); 2017 
WL 4987635.  
 
Overriding royalty interest (“ORRI”) Owners brought suit against current 
oil and gas Operator for unpaid ORRI, penalties, and attorney fees. 
Additional royalty interest owners intervened. Operator filed reconventional 
demand, asserting that it was entitled to an offset and/or recoupment of 
ORRI, and seeking damages for a misrepresentation of the condition of a 
wellbore. Operator also filed third-party complaint against a Prior Operator, 
claiming that it was entitled to reimbursement of ORRI payments 
erroneously made to Prior Operator and for damages related to the 
wellbore. Prior Operator filed a reconventional demand against current 
operator, alleging breach of purchase and sale agreement. Trial court 
entered judgment in favor of Owners and Operator appealed. The appellate 
court affirmed and remanded, holding that the proportionate reduction 
clause contained in the conveyance documents of the assignment of the 
prior lease from Prior Operator to Operator did not affect calculation of 
ORRI and that the failure of the trial court to award ORRI owners penalties 
or attorney fees for Operator’s failure to pay ORRI was not a manifest 
abuse of discretion.  
 
Sweet Lake Land & Oil Co. v. Oleum Operating Co., 2017-464 (La. App. 3 
Cir. 10/18/17); 229 So.3d 993. 
 
Operator was found liable for environmental damage due to oil and gas 
exploration activities on Landowner’s property. At trial, Operator moved to 
adopt State Regulator’s remediation plan under state law, which states that 
the court should adopt the plan for “evaluation or remediation” unless 
another party proves by a preponderance of the evidence that another plan 
is more feasible. The trial court denied Operator’s motion and ordered 
Operator to perform additional work, and because the plan was only 
partially remedial in nature, some elements of the plan called for evaluation 
in the form of future testing. On appeal, the appellate court conceded that 
while the plan was denied without any evidence that another plan was more 
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feasible, the trial court did not err. The panel reasoned that the trial judge 
acts as a “gatekeeper,” to ensure that land is remediated effectively. 
Therefore, courts have the power to reject a plan it determines is 
incomplete, despite the language found in the state law. 
 
North Dakota  
 
Black Hills Trucking, Inc. v. N.D. Indus. Comm’n, 2017 ND 284, 904 
N.W.2d 326. 
 
Transporter appealed a judgment affirming a large penalty imposed by 
North Dakota Industrial Commission (“Commission”) for illegally dumping 
saltwater, a byproduct of oilfield production, on local roads near a saltwater 
disposal well. Commission received multiple reports of incidents of the 
illegal disposal. Commission claimed violations of state administrative code 
for dumping the fluids on multiple occasions, for allowing the fluid to 
infiltrate the soil, and for failure to properly remove the discharged fluids 
from the roads. An evidentiary hearing was held in front of an ALJ which 
recommended that the complaints against Transporter be dismissed. 
However, the Commission rejected the ALJ’s recommendations and 
approved an alternate decision against Transporter by civilly penalizing it 
$950,000.00. The district court affirmed Commission’s order. On appeal, 
Transporter first argued that Commission lacked jurisdiction to impose a 
penalty for the discharge of waste away from an oil and gas site. 
Interpreting state administrative code broadly, the court found that 
Commission properly exercised its jurisdiction over Transporter’s illegal 
discharge. Second, Transporter claimed that if Commission had 
jurisdiction, its penalty encroached on the jurisdiction of the Department of 
Health (“Department”). However, the court held that the Department did 
not have primary jurisdiction over the oilfield waste matter and either 
Department or Commission could have exercised jurisdiction. Third, 
Transporter claimed that the penalty was excessive in violation of the state 
constitution. The court held that Transporter did not meet the evidentiary 
burden of proving that the actions of Commission were unconstitutional. 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the 
Commission’s order.  
 
Hallin v. Inland Oil & Gas Corp., 2017 ND 254, 903 N.W.2d 61.  
 
Lessors sued Operator claiming that oil and gas leases did not cover the 
entirety of a certain parcel of land. Lessors argued that the lease covered 
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only sixty acres and the remaining twenty acres were not leased. Operator 
argued that leases covered eighty acres because it conveyed all of Lessors’ 
mineral interests. Lessors and Operator moved for summary judgment. 
After concluding the leases were unambiguous, the district court granted 
summary judgment to Operator. Lessors appealed. The Supreme Court of 
North Dakota affirmed for several reasons. First, the court agreed that the 
lease was unambiguous because the leases specified that included was “all 
that certain tract of land” within the parcel. Second, because the leases were 
clear and unambiguous, extrinsic evidence was inadmissible. Finally, 
because Lessors had executed unambiguous leases conveying all of their 
mineral interest to Operator, Lessors were not entitled to equitable relief of 
partial cancellation.   
 
Sundance Oil & Gas, LLC v. Hess Corp., 2017 ND 269, 903 N.W.2d 712. 
 
Lessee 1 was granted a lease by Lessors in 2011 and recorded the lease in 
the same year. Lessee 1 then drilled three wells on the land. Lessee 2 
performed an investigation and title search into the land leased to Lessee 1, 
but did not find Lessee 1 or Lessors in connection with the land. Lessee 2 
petitioned to create a trust for the predecessor in interest of Lessors, which 
the court granted because Lessee had done the investigation. The trustee 
executed a lease with Lessee 2 in 2013. Lessee 2 then filed a quiet title 
action to have title of the property declared to belong to it and not Lessee 1. 
Lessee 2 moved for summary judgment, asserting that the trust action 
caused res judicata on the issue of title to the leasehold interest. Lessee 2 
also contended that it was a good faith purchaser of the interest because of 
its prior title search and investigation. The district court agreed with Lessee 
2 and granted summary judgment. The Supreme Court of North Dakota 
reversed, holding that res judicata does not apply since the quiet title action 
was different in kind from the trust action. The court also held that there 
was a genuine dispute over the material fact of whether Lessee 2 was a 
good faith purchaser. To be considered a good faith purchaser according to 
the court, an entity must not be on actual or constructive notice of superior 
title of another before the purchase. The court observed that applicable 
North Dakota law stated that the recording of a lease puts all others on 
constructive notice of an entity’s claim of superior right. The court then 
reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded for further 
proceedings. 
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Wilkinson v. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 2017 ND 231, 903 N.W.2d 51. 
 
Mineral Owners conveyed land to State but reserved the mineral estate. 
State built a dam and flooded the area conveyed, then later leased the 
minerals to various companies. Mineral Owners brought suit to quiet title to 
the mineral estate. The trial court granted summary judgment for State 
giving it both the mineral and surface estate. Mineral Owners appealed 
alleging that the State had committed a taking for which it had not 
compensated the Mineral Owners for, that new statutory law that had been 
enacted after trial but before appeal applied, and that summary judgment 
was improper because there was a genuine issue as to material facts. The 
Supreme Court of North Dakota agreed with Mineral Owners on all issues. 
State had committed a taking if the mineral estate had been granted to State 
and if the flooding by the state had deprived Mineral Owners of their rights 
although Mineral Owners had been able to lease to oil and gas companies 
despite the flooding. The new statutory law applied because it was enacted 
during the appellate period and stated that it had a retroactive effect. There 
were disputed material facts because the parties disputed whether the 
flooding was a result of State action and whether the flooded area is part of 
Lake Sakakawea or of the Missouri River. 
 
Texas 
 
Bradley v. Shaffer, No. 11-15-00247-CV, 2017 WL 5907319 (Tex. App. 
Nov. 30, 2017).  
 
Beneficiary, along with his sister, was vested one-third of a mineral trust 
established by his grandparents. The trust contained the following provision 
pertaining to its duration: “This Trust shall be for a term of twenty (20) 
years from the latest date of execution by an initial Trustor. This Trust may 
be continued upon unanimous agreement of all beneficiaries hereunder.” 
Beneficiary conveyed his ownership of the land in question to Recipient 
and later granted Recipient his mineral interests which were subject to the 
trust and any interest held in trust that he might acquire in the future. Prior 
to the twenty-year anniversary of the trust, the Trustees along with 
Beneficiary filed suit against Recipient seeking a declaratory judgment that 
the conveyances to Recipient were void with respect to the mineral interests 
held by the trust. Subsequent Trustees executed an extension of the trust 
that extended it for another twenty years. In the suit, the Trustees asserted 
that the trust owned all the mineral interests and that Beneficiary did not 
have any title in the minerals to convey to Recipient. Recipient 
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subsequently asserted that Beneficiaries interest was officially conveyed to 
him out of the trust after the death of his grandfather, the original trust 
holder, and the extension of the trust by Trustees was void because it 
violated the rule of perpetuities. The trial court found that Beneficiary did 
not have authority to convey his interest to Recipient and voided all 
conveyances to Recipient. Recipient appealed, and the appellate court 
affirmed the lower court, holding that an extension of a trust does not 
violate the rule of perpetuities and since the mineral interest never left the 
trust, Beneficiaries conveyance to Recipient was void as a matter of law. 
 
Fitzgerald v. Cadle Co., NO. 12–16–00338–CV, 2017 WL 4675513 (Tex. 
Ct. App. Oct. 18, 2017).   
 
Creditor obtained an agreed judgment against a mineral interest owner 
(“Owner”). After several failed attempts to collect the judgment, Creditor 
asked the trial court to order Owner to turnover royalty payments from the 
mineral lease to him. The trial court issued such order and further ordered 
Owner to provide disclosures of all property and to file periodic 
accountings. Owner filed a motion to vacate the turnover order, asserting 
that the property was his homestead and, therefore, the royalty payments 
were protected from turnover. The trial court denied the motion and Owner 
appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded the order for two 
reasons. First, Owner and Creditor stipulated that the property in question 
was Owner’s homestead. Under Texas law, homestead property is exempt 
from turnover. As such, the royalty payments are protected from turnover, 
and the trial court abused its discretion in denying Owner’s motion to 
vacate. Second, the trial court abused its discretion in ordering Owner to 
provide disclosures and accountings because the trial court abused its 
discretion by ordering the turnover of exempt property and there was no 
evidence of any other non-exempt property.  
 
Hahn v. Gips, No. 13-16-00336-CV, 2017 WL 4837877 (Tex. App. Oct. 
26, 2017). 
 
Landowner 1 sued Landowner 2 and Company claiming he had a one-
eighth (“1/8th”) royalty interest in Tract A of land and that he had a one-
fourth (“1/4th”) mineral interest in Tract B of land. In response, Landowner 
2 filed motion for summary judgment claiming that previous conveyances 
(the “2002 partition deeds,” or “partition deeds”) did not refer to 
reservations of mineral estates and, therefore, Landowner 1 only retained a 
1/8th royalty interest in Tract A. Among other things, the lower court 
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granted Landowner 2’s motion for summary judgment and, denied 
Landowner 1’s partial motion for summary judgment and, as such, 
Landowner 1 is only entitled to a 1/8th royalty interest for a term of fifteen 
years. On appeal, the appellate court found that because other cotenants of 
the mineral estate were not included in the partition deeds, no cotenant is 
bound by the partition deed. This means it was an error of the lower court to 
find that the partition deeds transferred “anything more than the surface 
estate of Tract A and Tract B,” and after the partition deeds Landowner 1 
retained a 1/4th interest of the mineral estate. Therefore, the subsequent 
deed between Landowner 1 and Landowner 2 which reserved a 1/8th 
royalty interest, conveyed a one hundred percent transfer of the surface 
estate to Landowner 2 and a 1/4th interest in the mineral rights of the parent 
property (Tracts A and B). 
 
VirTex Operating Co. v. Bauerle, No. 04-16-00549-CV, 2017 WL 5162546 
(Tex. App. Nov. 8, 2017).  
  
Landowners owned the surface estate of an 8,500-acre tract of land that 
they used to run a commercial hunting business and cattle operation; the 
main source of income for the ranch stemmed from the hunting leases under 
which hunters used helicopters for a number of game operations, 
including deer captures and predator control. Oil Company owned the full 
mineral fee estate underlying the property and executed an oil and gas lease 
to Lessee. Lessee drilled several wells and paid monthly royalties 
to Landowners, after which Landowners entered into a surface use 
agreement with Lessee that allowed it to install tank batteries. Lessee 
intended to install overhead power lines to generate power to the pump 
jacks, so it asked Landowners to sign an easement 
allowing the installation. Landowners filed a declaratory judgment action 
requesting that the trial court declare that Lessee's installation of the 
overhead power lines would substantially impair Landowners preexisting 
use of the "lateral surface and super-adjacent airspace" of the property, 
which included use of the helicopters for game operations. Lessee 
counterclaimed, asserting that Landowners were interfering with its right to 
extract the minerals by prohibiting the installation of the overhead power 
lines. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Landowners and Lessee 
appealed. The appellate court held in favor of Landowners, reasoning that 
they produced sufficient evidence to meet the elements of the 
Accommodation Doctrine. Specifically, Landowners showed that: (1) their 
use of the surface and adjacent airspace would be substantially impaired by 
the installation of the overhead power lines; (2) there were no reasonable 
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alternative methods by which Landowners could continue leasing the ranch 
to hunters who managed the property by helicopter; and (3) there was a 
reasonable and industry-accepted alternative by which Lessee could power 
the pump jacks.  
 
XTO Energy Inc. v. Goodwin, No. 12-16-00068-CV, 2017 WL 4675136 
(Tex. App. Oct. 18, 2017). 
 
Lessee failed to pay the proper bonus amount to Lessor, so the lease was 
void. Lessee, despite the voided lease, drilled horizontal wells that crossed 
Lessor’s property line, pooled the lease with others near it, and paid Lessor, 
after he signed a division order, a royalty for his contribution to a pool that 
did not include the horizontal well. Lessor sued Lessee for trespass, bad 
faith trespass, conversion, fraud, and bad faith pooling. In the trial court, the 
jury found that Lessee committed trespass, bad faith trespass, conversion, 
and bad faith pooling and denied Lessee’s motion to recover the costs of 
paying Lessor the royalty. The appellate court affirmed the finding of 
trespass because Lessor had an interest in preventing trespass of any 
property at any depth not within the mineral interest, but reversed on the 
amount of damages because the calculation was based on unreliable 
testimony. It also affirmed the denial of Lessee’s motion to recover the 
royalty payment because although Lessor was unjustly enriched, Lessee 
was on notice that it did not need to pay Lessor and voluntarily did so. The 
appellate court reversed on the issues of bad faith trespass, conversion, and 
bad faith pooling. Bad faith trespass was reversed because the jury did not 
find malice or fraud prerequisite for bad faith. Bad faith pooling was 
reversed because Lessee could not have pooled at all since the lease was 
void and the power to pool was based on the lease. Conversion was 
reversed because Lessor’s theory of recovery for conversion was based 
upon the bad faith pooling, which was reversed. 
 
West Virginia 
 
Kidder v. Montani Energy, LLC, No. 16-1109, 2017 WL 5509927 (W. Va. 
Nov. 17, 2017). 
 
Landowners conveyed their property to four of their six children but 
excepted oil and gas royalties in the conveyance (“1910 deeds”). 
Landowners died intestate and the reserved interest passed to all six 
children. Child One and her husband conveyed their interest to Child Two, 
but reserved oil and gas royalties in the same way her parents did in their 
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initial conveyance. Operator One later acquired oil and gas leases for 
portions of the property in dispute. Another party claimed to have 
purchased oil and gas rights from Child Two’s interest on a date before 
Operator One claims to have gotten any interest. Several operators filed a 
“Complaint to Determine Title” in the lower court, and the heirs of Child 1 
(“Heirs”) responded to the complaint which Operator One then responded 
to. The lower court granted summary judgment in favor of Operator One 
because the 1910 deeds “reserved a royalty interest only, and the oil and gas 
ownership rights thus passed with the land conveyance.” Heirs now claim 
that: (1) the 1910 deeds reserve royalty interest and “the oil and gas in 
place;” and (2) the lower court failed to consider “ownership of all of the oil 
and gas that was conveyed in the 1910 deeds.” First, the court found the 
1910 deed did not convey the oil and gas in place because a mere 
reservation of oil and gas royalties conveys the ownership interest in the oil 
and gas and the Landowners did not make clear an intention to reserve the 
oil and gas in place. The Heirs’ second argument was dismissed because it 
related to a tract of land which Operator One did not request relief for. 
Accordingly, summary judgment was affirmed. This is an unpublished 
opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be consulted before 
citing the case as precedent. 
 
Wyoming 
 
Bear Peak Res., LLC v. Peak Powder River Res., LLC, 2017 WY 124, 403 
P.3d 1033 (Wyo. 2017). 
 
Acquirer and Developer entered into a purchase and sale agreement 
(“PSA”) whereby Developer agreed to purchase certain oil and gas interests 
owned by Acquirer. The PSA also contained an agreement for procurement 
of additional mineral interests within an Area of Mutual Interest (“AMI”) 
over a two-year term, which contemplated situations where Acquirer would 
purchase interests in the AMI and would then offer Developer the 
opportunity to purchase the interests. In 2013, Developer sent two separate 
notice letters stating that Acquirer was not performing its obligations based 
on reasonable industry standards. In July 2013, Developer notified Acquirer 
that Acquirer continued to fail to perform and that the AMI was terminated. 
The trial court determined that Developer was entitled to summary 
judgment. The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed in part and reversed 
and remanded in part. The court found that the PSA’s plain language was 
unambiguous because Developer was able to purchase interests only in 
three specified instances and did not allow Developer to purchase interests 
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for any reason. The court concluded that the trial court erred when it 
determined that Developer properly terminated the AMI. Instead, under the 
PSA, the trial court should have considered what the reasonable industry 
standards were to determine whether Developer’s dissatisfaction was 
“reasonably determined.” The court determined that some interests that 
were acquired were after Developer had proposed a well, and, therefore, the 
AMI did not apply. Additionally, the court concluded that the trial court did 
not err when it applied the conventional definition of “proposed a well” 
because Acquirer did not offer any evidence to show that “proposed a well” 
was a term of art in the industry. 
 
Lon V. Smith Found. v. Devon Energy Corp., 2017 WY 121, 403 P.3d 997 
(Wyo. 2017). 
 
Trustee, a California resident, obtained numerous oil and gas interests in his 
lifetime, including an overriding royalty interest (“ORRI”) carved from a 
federal oil and gas lease located in Wyoming. In his will, Trustee 
bequeathed the ORRI, along with all of his oil and gas interests, to his Wife 
for life, with the remainder to go to his Foundation. After Trustee’s death, a 
California court conducted the probate and granted Wife only the oil and 
gas interests but never included the ORRI. Later, a Wyoming court 
accepted and adopted the California probate order (“the Order”). Lessee of 
the land upon which the oil and gas interest lay sued the Foundation, 
claiming ownership of the ORRI. The district court ruled in favor of Lessee, 
finding that the Order was a final order and the intent of Trustee was 
irrelevant after a final order had been made. Foundation appealed, but the 
Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed. It held that the Order was never 
appealed and was a final order when it was adopted in Wyoming, thereby 
giving its terms effect regarding Wife’s property. Therefore, since the 
ORRI was not included in the probate, it passed to Wife in fee simple 
instead of a life estate and thus did not pass to Foundation upon Wife’s 
death. 
 
Midstream – Federal 
 
Fifth Circuit  
 
Boerschig v. Trans-Pecos Pipeline, L.L.C., 872 F.3d 701 (5th Cir. 2017). 
 
Landowner filed suit against Company for violation of due process in 
Company’s natural gas pipeline condemnation. The Fifth Circuit Court of 
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Appeals reviewed Company’s motion to dismiss Landowner’s appeal, 
finding that Landowner’s appeal was not irrelevant, even though some 
construction on the project had begun, because the court could still enforce 
some effective relief, restoring the land to its state prior to the 
condemnation. Although the lower court cited an Anti-Injunction Act 
(“Act”) as support for its refusal to grant an injunction, the court held that 
the applicability of such act is questionable in this case. Since in Texas 
there are separate processes, administrative and judicial, but those processes 
could be thought to merge at some point, there is a question of whether the 
Anti-Injunction Act would apply, depending on how the process was 
interpreted. The court here declined to determine whether or not the Act 
does apply in this case, instead evaluating whether the criteria for granting 
an injunction are met. The court determined that these criteria are not met 
because Landowner’s constitutional challenge did not hold high likelihood 
of success, so it would not meet the necessary requirements for the granting 
of an injunction. Further, even though Company’s actions constituted a 
“quick taking,” it was nevertheless allowed and not seen as a violation of 
due process based on the relevant statute’s history. This is because the 
standards in place guiding the requirement that the land be considered 
necessary for public use, and the judicial review of such determination, 
allow condemnation by Company to move forward, even though it is a 
private entity. The court noted that the constitutional challenge might be 
more likely to succeed if there was only a private benefit, rather than a 
public one, conveyed by the taking, but that was not the case here.  
 
D. District of Columbia  
 
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 16-1534 
(JEB), 2017 WL 6001726 (D.D.C. Dec. 4, 2017). 
 
Native American tribes (“Tribes”) sued the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
(“Corps”), claiming improper analysis on the potential environmental 
impact of a pipeline crossing underneath a lake which borders the Tribes’ 
reservations in violation of the National Environmental Policy Act 
(“NEPA”). This court previously refused to stop oil from flowing through 
the pipeline because the it found a “‘significant likelihood’ that the Corps 
could substantiate its prior conclusions” that did not violate NEPA. 
However, this court “left open the possibility of imposing other, interim 
conditions during remand [and] ordered further briefing . . . which is now 
complete.” Although this court previously decided that it had jurisdiction 
“to order interim remedies,” the Corps now argues that the court’s 
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conditions on remand go beyond the court’s authority. This court rejected 
the Corps’ argument because it mischaracterizes what the Tribes seek as an 
injunction—but that is not what the Tribes seek. Because the interim 
conditions set out by the court are no more than information-gathering 
measures which do not interrupt the remand process, they are within the 
court’s lawful authority. What’s more, the court reasoned that recent oil 
spills demonstrate that some level of oversight is necessary. As to the 
conditions themselves, they are: (1) finalization and implementation of spill 
response plans; (2) a third-party audit; and (3) public reporting of pipeline 
operations. The first will stand because even though the Corps contends the 
parties are themselves carrying out the condition, the court will enforce the 
order because “of the case’s history of contested versions of discussions.” 
The second condition will stand because it is reasonable to have a third-
party audit. Finally, the third condition will stand because it is not unduly 
burdensome on the pipeline developer which agreed “to ‘voluntarily’ report 
on many of the issues raised by the Tribes.” 
 
D. Montana  
 
Indigenous Envtl. Network v. United States Dep't of State, No. CV-17-29-
GF-BMM, 2017 WL 5632435 (D. Mont. Nov. 22, 2017).  
  
After the United States Department of State ("Department") approved and 
issued a Presidential Permit to Pipeline Company to construct, connect, 
operate, and maintain an 875-mile long pipeline across the border of the 
United States, Organization challenged the decision to issue the Presidential 
Permit, seeking for Department to withdraw its approval of the pipeline and 
Presidential Permit until Pipeline Company has complied with National 
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”). Department moved to 
dismiss Organization's complaint for lack of jurisdiction and failure to 
present a cause of action; it also argued that the issuance of a Presidential 
Permit by a federal agency pursuant to an Executive Order constitutes 
Presidential action immune from judicial review under the Administrative 
Procedure Act ("APA"). Here, the court held that the Department's 
regulations would require a NEPA review. The court also looked at 
whether Organization lacked standing due to vague allegations regarding 
adverse environmental and cultural impacts from the pipeline, and for 
failing to allege a sufficient concrete interest in listed species that would be 
harmed. The court analyzed whether Organization established: (1) injury-
in-fact; (2) plausible connection between Department's conduct and 
Organization's injury; and (3) redressability, holding that Department's 
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motions to dismiss were denied, and Organization's motions to dismiss 
were also denied.  
 
D. North Dakota 
 
Olin v. Dakota Access, LLC, No. 1:17-cv-007, 2017 WL 4532581 (D.N.D. 
Oct. 10, 2017). 
 
Developer of a pipeline (“Company 1”) hired Company 2 (together, 
“Companies”) to contact Landowners to negotiate easements. Landowners 
make four claims against the Companies: (1) Company 1 violated North 
Dakota law by using “unfair tactics in acquiring land easements;” (2) 
Company 1 committed fraud; (3) Company 2 committed fraud; and (4) the 
Companies committed civil conspiracy. Landowners claim that Company 2 
represented, among other things, to them that if they signed easement 
agreements, they would get a twenty percent signing bonus, but if they 
refused to sign the Landowners would get little if anything in eminent 
domain proceedings. Landowners further allege that they signed the 
easement agreements because of the representations made by Company 2 
and that other landowners received more money for easements. The court 
disagrees with the Landowners’ two fraud claims for three reasons. First, 
Landowners do not meet heightened particularity standard because their 
amended complaint only refers to agents or employees of the Companies—
not individual names—nor does it include times when negotiations 
occurred or by what means any conversation took place. Second, the fraud 
is not actionable in North Dakota because alleged factual statements were 
all contingent on future events. Third, any statements made outside of the 
contract itself could not be relied upon because of the easement contracts’ 
integration clause. The Companies also did not violate North Dakota law by 
using unfair tactics in acquiring easements because all of the alleged 
statements are merely sales talk and puffery, not misrepresentation, 
deception, fraud, or something else required by statute. Finally, 
Landowners’ civil conspiracy argument fails because “there is not an 
actionable underlying tort claim to support the civil conspiracy claim.” 
Company 2’s motion to dismiss and Company 1’s motion for judgment on 
the pleadings are both granted. This case has since been appealed, but there 
is no decision from the higher court as of publication. 
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E.D. Michigan  
Nexus Gas Transmission, LLC v. 0.4 Acres +/- Permanent Easement and 
0.8 +/- Temporary Easement of Land in August Township, Washtenaw 
County, Michigan, Case No. 17-cv-13220, 2017 WL 4778727 (E.D. Mich. 
Oct. 23, 2017). 
Company brought a condemnation act seeking an easement over 
Landowner’s property. The court granted Company’s motion for summary 
judgment finding: (1) the Federal Energy Regulation Commission 
(“FERC”) issued a certificate of public service and necessity to Company 
authorizing the pipeline; (2) the use of the easement is necessary for the 
construction of the project; and (3) Company cannot acquire the easement 
by contract if it cannot come to an agreement with the owners on 
compensation. The court granted Company’s partial summary judgment 
because Company had a valid certificate of public convenience and 
necessity issued by FERC pursuant to the Natural Gas Act. The court also 
granted Company’s preliminary injunctive relief for three reasons. First, 
Company won on the partial summary judgment which waves heavily in 
favor of granting the injunction. Second, court found irreparable harm 
where a gas company needed to proceed construction of pipeline where 
construction delays could add costs to the project. Third, it would not cause 
substantial harm to Landowners. 
 
M.D. Pennsylvania  
 
Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. Permanent Easement for 7.053 Acres, 
Permanent Overlay Easement for 1.709 Acres and Temporary Easement for 
8.551 Acres in Milford and Westfall Townships, Pike County Pennsylvania, 
No. 3:12-CV-01477, 2017 WL 4954093 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 2017). 
 
Pipeline Company filed a complaint in condemnation of property on July 
31, 2012 seeking to acquire a permanent easement and temporary 
easements on properties owned by Landowner. Pipeline Company owned 
an existing permanent easement of varying width across the property. On 
October 2, a Stipulated Order was entered granting the right to access, and 
Pipeline Company immediately adhered to the stipulation therein and took 
access and possession of the rights of way. The action was administratively 
reopened, and the parties participated in discovery. The court granted in 
part and denied in part Pipeline Company’s motion for summary judgment 
on August 30, 2017. On September 21, 2017, Landowners filed a motion 
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requesting the Memorandum and Order from the most recent decision be 
certified to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals for an interlocutory appeal. 
The court determined that this case was of such an unsettled nature and so 
recurrent in the court, that it was the type of “exceptional case” that 
warrants an interlocutory appeal and granted the motion. 
 
N.D. Florida  
 
Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. +/- 18.27 Acres of Land in Levy Cty., 
Florida, No. 1:16CV93-MW/GRJ, 2017 WL 5494552 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 15, 
2017). 
 
In 2016, the court granted Pipeline Company’s motion for partial summary 
judgment as to its right to condemn an easement through Landowners’ 
property to build a natural gas pipeline. Pipeline Company took possession 
and began and ended construction of the pipeline within a year’s time. The 
activities caused a great deal of emotional pain and destroyed several 
mature live oak trees on the property during construction, prevented 
Landowners from leasing pasture to cattle farmers, and prevented 
Landowners from planting more profitable crops. Pipeline Company 
brought the issue to the court to determine whether these kinds of losses 
may be compensated and moved for partial summary judgment. The court 
determined that the use of eminent domain decreased the value of 
Landowners’ land and caused Landowners to not be able to plant 
watermelon in the affected fields. Landowners would have had a higher net 
income despite the construction, so the court denied Pipeline Company’s 
summary judgment motion as to the issue of crop-income losses. 
Additionally, the court denied the balance outlined in Pipeline Company’s 
motion as a jury may consider evidence of lost grazing fees and watermelon 
crop income losses in determining full compensation. However, the court 
granted the motion for partial summary judgment to the extent that 
Landowners sought compensation for the separate appraisal value of each 
oak tree and Landowners were permitted to present evidence of severance 
damages resulting from the loss of the trees.  
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Midstream – State 
 
Louisiana  
 
Chauvin v. Shell Oil Co., 16-609 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/25/17), No. 16-CA-
609, 2017 WL 4800236.  
 
Landowners’ descendants (“Descendants”), after learning of their possible 
ownership, brought suit alleging trespass and damages caused by oil and 
gas pipelines installed on land. Oil and Gas Company (“Company”), along 
with several others who were granted servitudes over the property, filed a 
motion for summary judgment claiming that Company had purchased the 
land from Landowners. The district court granted the motion and 
Descendants appealed. The appellate court affirmed the judgment for 
several reasons. First, both parties’ surveyors concluded that the property 
which Company purchased from Landowners included that which the 
pipelines now extend. Second, if Landowners had believed that they still 
owned some of the property, they would have bequeathed it to their heirs as 
they did with other real property. Third, the actions by Company on the 
property and the non-actions taken by Landowners suggest that parties 
intended Company to acquire ownership of the property. Finally, 
Company’s ownership was further established by acquisitive prescription 
because they had satisfied the requirements for ownership via thirty years 
of possession.  
 
Mississippi  
 
Elmore v. Dixie Pipeline Co., No. 2015-CA-01499-COA, 2017 WL 
4386686 (Miss. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2017).  
 
Operator operated a pipeline in which liquid propane was transported. The 
pipeline was constructed in 1961 and was manufactured using a low-
frequency electric resistance welding (“ERW”) process. In the late 1980’s, 
the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 
(“Administration”) issued an alert notice to all hazardous-liquid propane 
operators who used ERW pipelines and advised them of the pipelines’ 
operational failures. The notices contained recommendations by the 
Administration but did not require the operators to cease operation or 
remove and replace the pipes. In 2007, Operator’s pipeline ruptured, and 
some propane vaporized and exploded. Landowner claimed that his house 
suffered structural damage from the shockwaves. Landowner sued Operator 
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for negligence, strict liability, and punitive damages. The National 
Transportation Safety Board (“NTSB”) investigated the rupture and 
concluded that no defects or anomalies existed and that the rupture was not 
a result of corrosion, excavation damage, the controller’s actions, or the 
operating conditions of the pipeline. Operator moved for summary 
judgment. The lower court granted its motion as to the strict-liability and 
punitive damages claims. Operator later renewed its motion for summary 
judgment on the negligence claim after Landowner’s expert witness’s 
testimony was excluded. The court granted the motion, and Landowner 
appealed. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the transportation of 
liquid propane was not considered an ultrahazardous activity and, therefore, 
was not subject to strict liability. Additionally, based on the NTSB’s 
determinations, the court concluded that there was no evidence that the 
pipeline would not have ruptured had Operator used proper care. 
 
Pennsylvania  
 
Foster II v. Dickson, No. 1553 WDA 2016, 2017 WL 4679749 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. Oct. 18, 2017). 
 
Brother sued Sister in a dispute over future payments stemming from gas 
pipeline operations. Their Parents, original owners of several tracts of land, 
entered into a right of way agreement with an energy company. In the 
agreement, Parents conveyed to the energy company a right of way and 
easement along a specified route to install gas pipelines. Later, Parents 
conveyed their land to Sister, by deed, granting all surface rights and 
payments for surface use and damages, reserving however to the parents 
one-half of all future payments for the placement of right of ways and/or 
pipelines across the land. Immediately after this conveyance to Sister, the 
parents assigned to Brother all of their one-half undivided interest in and to 
future payments for the placement of right of ways and/or pipelines across 
the property. The energy company later installed a pipeline, paid one-half 
the consideration to Sister, but withheld the remaining half of the 
consideration from Brother. Brother filed suit for declaratory judgment, 
claiming that he was entitled to the funds as they represented fifty percent 
(“50%”) payment for placement of right-of-ways and pipelines on the 
property. Sister claimed she was entitled to the remaining proceeds as they 
were payments simply for “surface use and damages.” Trial court entered 
judgment for Brother and Sister appealed. The appellate court affirmed, 
reasoning that the deed explicitly stated that Parents reserved 50% of the 
amount received for the placement of pipelines on or across the property in 
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the future. By the plain meaning of the language in the deed, the court 
continued, Parents and Sister were to split equally the payment for new 
pipelines, and thereafter the assignment grants to Brother any interest that 
would go to the parents. Thus, Brother was entitled to 50% of the total 
amount as the trial court determined.  
 
In re Condemnation by Sunoco Pipelines L.P., No. 1780 C.D. 2016, 2017 
WL 4783584 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Oct. 24, 2017). 
 
Transporter sought to condemn a permanent easement, a temporary 
workspace easement, a permanent road easement, a permanent block valve 
easement, and a fenced-in block valve site for the construction and 
operation of a portion of its pipeline project. Condemnee objected to the 
condemnation and alleged that it violated state law regarding eminent 
domain. The trial court overruled Condemnee’s objections. Condemnee 
appealed, raising several issues including: (1) whether Transporter’s 
pipeline was needed to meet the state’s natural gas liquids demand; (2) 
whether state public utility commission’s procedures unconstitutionally 
excluded landowners impacted by the pipeline; (3) whether there was a 
trustee of the state’s natural resources for the pipeline; and (4) whether the 
trial court abused its discretion by not holding excessive taking and bond 
sufficiency hearings. In analyzing the public need, the court addressed 
Transporter’s status as a public utility and the nature of the pipeline project. 
The court agreed with previous cases dealing with the same pipeline 
company which found that Transporter, a private company, may exercise 
eminent domain since it had been certified a public utility by the court. 
Furthermore, due to procedural timing issues, the court held that 
Condemnee had waived its claims regarding landowner exclusion, lack of 
notice, its natural resources trustee claim, and its excessive takings claim. 
However, the court found that the trial court should have held a bond 
sufficiency hearing before overruling Condemnee’s objections and 
remanded the issue back to the trial court. This is an unpublished opinion of 
the court; therefore, state court rules should be consulted before citing the 
case as precedent.  
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Downstream  
 
10th Circuit  
 
Sinclair Wyo. Ref. Co. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 874 F.3d 1159 
(10th Cir. 2017).   
 
Congress issued an amendment to the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) in 2005 that 
directed the EPA to operate a Renewable Fuel Standards Program 
(“Program”) in order to increase the use of renewable fuels by oil refineries; 
however, Congress added an exception for small oil refineries. For small 
refineries that would suffer a “disproportionate economic hardship,” EPA 
was required to grant exemptions from the Program on a case-by-case basis. 
In a study conducted by the Department of Energy (“DOE”), Operator was 
considered to be a small refinery to which the Program would cause such 
hardship. In evaluating the petitions for exemption from the Program, EPA 
was required to consult with DOE and consider the findings of the study 
DOE had conducted. Operator petitioned for an exemption from the 
Program, but EPA denied the petition because it determined that Operator 
was profitable enough to pay the Program’s cost. Operator sought review 
from the court. The court determined that, according to EPA, 
“disproportionate economic hardship” meant a threat to the existence of the 
small refinery or a significant threat to the operation of the business. 
However, the court concluded that a plain meaning of “disproportionate 
economic hardship” was required. The court determined that the definition 
should be one that makes the businesses life difficult to continue and 
financially sustain. The court concluded that “an experience that causes 
hardship is less burdensome than an experience that threatens one’s very 
existence.” EPA’s definition was too strict, too narrow, and it was 
completely at odds with Congress’s statutory command. Therefore, the 
court held that EPA exceeded its statutory authority and vacated EPA’s 
decision. 
 
Louisiana  
 
Cormier v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 2017-104 (La. App. 3 Cir. 10/4/17); 
228 So.3d 770. 
 
Oil Refinery Workers (“Workers”) filed personal injury suit against Oil 
Company alleging exposure to slop oil after spill at facility. The district 
court found in favor of Workers and awarded damages. Oil Company 
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appealed the amount of the award, alleging that the district court abused its 
discretion because the awards were much higher than those given in similar 
cases. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the amount of damages, 
holding that although the awards were on the high end for the particular 
injuries suffered, they did not amount to an abuse of discretion by the trial 
judge. The court also held that the awards were not grossly disproportionate 
to the medical expenses incurred by Workers because, due to the nature of 
the injuries sustained, medical expenses in their case would be low 
compared to the general damages suffered by Workers. 
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SELECTED WATER DECISIONS 
 
Federal 
 
9th Circuit 
Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 874 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 
2017).  
Environmental Organization filed suit against Utility Company under the 
citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) and the Resource 
Conversation Recovery Act (“RCRA”). It alleged that Utility Company had 
disregarded toxic wood treatment chemicals at its facility. The district court 
granted Utility Company summary judgment on RCRA claim. On appeal, 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed and 
remanded in part. RCRA is an environmental statute that governs treatment, 
storage, and disposal of solid and hazardous waste. It allows for private 
enforcement through citizen action. The endangerment provision does not 
require private citizen to prove any specific violation of RCRA 
requirements. The court held that there was no evidence that Utility 
Company’s trucks picked up contaminants on their trips and carried them 
offsite. court held that the district court erred in applying the RCRA anti-
duplication provision. The abuse of the CWA permit did not trigger 
RCRA’s anti-duplication provision. Utility Company failed to provide legal 
requirements to show why permits were necessary. The court reversed the 
district court’s summary judgment on Utility Company and the denial of 
Environmental Organization’s arguments regarding storm water and 
remanded to consider the Environmental Organization’s storm water 
pathway and solid waste. It affirmed the partial summary judgment on the 
tire-tracking pathway.  
 
Navajo Nation v. Dep't. of the Interior, 876 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2017).  
 
A federally recognized Indian Tribe (“Tribe”), living in parts of Arizona, 
New Mexico, and Utah relies heavily on the Colorado River waters, 
considering that most of its lands are "of the desert kind." It was previously 
held in Arizona v. California, where the United States Supreme Court 
reaffirmed the vitality of the Winters doctrine – reserving water rights for 
federal lands –, and that water from the Colorado River was essential to the 
life of the tribes, their people, the animals they hunted, and the crops they 
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raised. The Decree awarded five tribes a right to Lower Basin water but 
declined to reach the claims of the twenty other tribes, one being 
Tribe. Since this Decree, Tribe has repeatedly asserted its right to water in 
the Lower Colorado but these rights have not yet been recognized. Tribe 
filed its initial complaint against Department of the Interior (“DOI”), 
alleging that DOI failed to adequately consider and protect Tribe’s rights to 
water, thus violating the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"). The 
district court dismissed Tribe’s claims, finding that the alleged harm to 
Nation’s unrecognized Winters rights was too speculative to confer 
standing. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal, 
reasoning that Tribe could not show that harm to its concrete interests—
here, its possible Winters rights—was reasonably probable. It also held that 
the alleged adverse effect on Tribe's generalized interest in availability of 
water did not show that Tribe suffered injury required for Article III 
standing. 
 
United States v. Robertson, 875 F.3d 1281 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 
Developer appealed his conviction in district court for violating the Clean 
Water Act (“CWA”) by: (1) knowingly, and without a permit, discharging 
dredged material from a point source into a United States water source; and 
(b) willfully injured United States’ property by constructing a series of 
ponds on both National Forest System Lands and on privately owned 
mining land. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal upheld his conviction, 
holding that: (1) the test for determining whether creek and wetlands into 
which Developer discharged dredges material is subject to the CWA 
whether or not there was a significant nexus between them and the 
navigable waters in the traditional sense; (2) Developer had fair warning 
that without a permit his conduct was considered criminal; (3) for expert 
witness testimony it did not matter if the expert used the binding regulations 
or the enforcement guidelines; (4) the ordinary high water mark was 
properly considered by the expert witness in evaluating whether the 
material was dredge material being disposed of; (5) the exclusion of the 
Army Corps of Engineers manual was not an abuse of discretion by the 
court; and (6) it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude the study looking 
at existing contamination. 
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10th Circuit  
 
City of Eudora v. Rural Water Dist. No. 4, Douglas Cty., Kansas, 875 F.3d 
1030 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 
Water District and City disagreed as to which entity could provide water 
services to particular areas in the county. Water District had to obtain 
financing to expand and to ensure water services to all parts of its service 
area; at approximately the same time, City annexed the Water District’s 
service area. Under state law, a municipality replaces a rural water district 
after annexation. However, Water District believed that if it restructured its 
financing to include a federally-guaranteed loan, it would receive federal 
protection that would prevent City from assuming its water customers while 
the USDA loan was in repayment. This case addressed the third appeal to 
determine who is entitled to provide water service to the disputed service 
area. City sought declaration from the court that it may provide water 
service to the annexed area without violating Water District’s rights after 
the reaffirmation. The district court again found for City, because even 
under its new strategy of obtaining federal protection, Water District did not 
meet the requirements set forth in subsequent cases dealing with this matter. 
Water District appealed, claiming that City’s action was barred by res 
judicta, that City’s action was barred by the rule against claim-splitting, and 
that its new legal and financial structure of the federally-guaranteed loan 
provided them with the requirements under state law to receive federal 
protection. The court noted that Water District’s arguments for res judicta 
would only be successful if all claim preclusion requirements were met. 
The court determined that the reaffirmation of the loan’s guarantee did not 
constitute a separate transaction for claim preclusion purposes. 
Additionally, the court found that Water District’s other claims were 
without merit and irrelevant. 
 
Federal Claims 
 
Baley v. United States, No. 1-591L, 2017 WL 4342771 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 29, 
2017). 
 
Class of Farmers (“Class”) sued the Federal Government following 
termination of water and water delivery service out of precaution to respect 
certain tribal rights and to adhere to the Endangered Species Act. Following 
a trial, several substantive issues remained. First, the court determined that 
Federal Government’s motion for summary judgment against shareholders 
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of a company that contracted with for purposes of water delivery should be 
granted. The motion was granted because of a previous order by this court 
which bars claims of those shareholders. In that order, this court determined 
that the shareholders’ claims are barred because their interests are only 
derivative of the company’s water rights instead of being beneficial water 
rights of their own. Therefore, the shareholders’ claims were dismissed. 
Next, the court turned to the issue of whether the Government’s actions 
constituted a taking under the Fifth Amendment. Those remaining plaintiffs 
who claimed water rights through Warren Act contracts or lease agreements 
for land in the National Wildlife Refuge did not have an actionable takings 
claim because those agreements changed the water rights of those people in 
such a way that they cannot seek compensation against the Government. 
The remaining class members did, however, demonstrate a sufficient 
interest in property over the water because they were not subject to the 
same contractual terms. However, of those remaining class members, none 
were capable of recovering on the basis of a Takings Clause claim because 
several tribes had superior water rights when the Government terminated 
water delivery service. This case has since been appealed, but there is no 
decision from the higher court as of publication. 
 
Jackson v. United States, Nos. 14–397L/15–194L, 2017 WL 5586679 (Fed. 
Cl. Nov. 20, 2017). 
 
Property Owners sued Government alleging that a taking had occurred 
when the Surface Transportation Board issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use 
or Abandonment pursuant to the National Trails System Act. Property 
Owners argued that the prior landowners granted easements to the Middle 
Georgia & Atlantic Railway for the sole purpose of operating a railroad, 
and that the property reverted back to the Property Owners in fee simple 
once the easements were no longer being used for railroad operations. The 
court found that the easements were not broad enough to encompass trail 
use, thus siding with Property Owners and granting their motion for 
summary judgment, returning the property in fee simple to them. 
 
Sacramento Grazing Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, No. 04–786 L, 2017 WL 
5029063 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 3, 2017). 
 
Ranching Group filed a complaint against United States Forest Service 
(“USFS”) for an adjudication of its right to beneficial use of stock water 
sources within the Sacramento Allotment of the Lincoln National Forest 
that pre-dated federal control. USFS had installed enclosures that limited 
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the use of stock water resources. The court determined that: (1) Ranching 
Group’s Fifth Amendment Taking Clause claims were not barred by the 
statute of limitations; (2) Ranching Group had established a property 
interest, recognized by New Mexico law, in making beneficial use of stock 
water resources in the Lincoln National Forest; and (3) Ranching Group’s 
right to make beneficial use of stock water was abrogated by actions 
undertaken by the USFS in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings 
Clause. 
 
St. Bernard Parish Gov't v. United States, No. 15-637C, 2017 WL4675686 
(Fed. Cl. Oct. 18, 2017).  
  
On June 30, 2017, United States entered into an Agreement with Parish 
which provided that under the provisions of the Emergency Watershed 
Protection Program (“EWP”), United States was authorized to assist Parish 
in relieving hazards created by natural disasters that cause sudden 
impairment in a watershed. It also stated that the parties agreed to install 
emergency watershed protection measures to relieve hazards and damages 
created by Hurricane Katrina. In this action, Parish alleged that United 
States breached the Agreement by not paying it all the money it was due for 
the removal of sediment in the bayou in the aftermath of Hurricane 
Katrina. United States moved to dismiss the action, arguing that because the 
Agreement was not a contract but rather a “Cooperative Agreement” under 
the Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act (“FGCAA”), or 
alternatively that because the Agreement lacked consideration on the part 
of United States, the court lacked jurisdiction. The court held that the 
Agreement was to be considered a cooperative agreement and, 
therefore, Parish lacked jurisdiction in the court under the Tucker Act. It 
reasoned that not only was the Agreement labeled “Cooperative 
Agreement,” but that Parish was unable to point to any specific provision in 
the Agreement contemplating money damages for breach by United 
States. The court also noted that there was no consideration that rendered a 
benefit to United States, so the Agreement was not an enforceable contract 
in the court. This case has since been appealed, but there is no ruling from 
the higher court as of publication. 
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D. Arizona  
 
Roosevelt Irrigation Dist. v. United States, No. CV-15-00448-PHX-JJT, 
2017 WL 4364108 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2017).  
 
Utility Company filed a motion for partial summary judgement. Irrigation 
District sought judicial review regarding its contract to determine if it had 
the “right to pump ground water from its East Side Wells and transport the 
water for [its] use … does not terminate on October 26, 2020.” The court 
denied Utility Company’s motion for partial summary judgment and 
granted part of RID’s motion and denied part of it. Where the United States 
is a party, federal law governs the interpretation of such contracts. 
Contracts should be read as a whole, and extrinsic evidence of trade usage 
and course dealing may be considered when there is an ambiguity. The 
court looked at the plain language of the contract to determine the length of 
the contractual term. The court determined that the language of the contract 
was ambiguous regarding the contractual length of term. The court further 
determined that since it was ambiguous and extrinsic evidence could be 
support by each party that a determination should be made at trial. Utility 
Company contends that the contract requires the water Irrigation District 
receives distrusted in compliance with the “‘Warren Act’ which limit the 
use of waters pumped from United States Reclamation Service Projects to 
160 acres for any one land owner.” The court found Irrigation District 
failed to show a lack of genuine dispute regarding facts of Irrigation 
District’s right to pump under the contract beyond the date and that the 
length of the contract must go to trial. The court also noted that the contract 
at issue is not a Warrant Act contract, because no dispute existed as to the 
Secretary of the Interior as a non-party to the agreement. However, the 
court noted that a genius dispute existed as to the extent of which the parties 
incorporated terms of the Warrant Act. This is an unpublished opinion of 
the court; therefore, federal court rules should be consulted before citing the 
case as precedent.  
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State  
 
Arizona 
 
Henline v. Gregg, No. 1 CA-CV 16-0524, 2017 WL 4638258 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. Oct. 17, 2017).  
 
Members belonged to Water Co–Op, a co-operative association formed to 
supply water to an eighty-acre tract of land around a well in County. 
Members of Water Co-Op acquire interests therein proportionate to the 
number of acres they own; the Water Co-Op itself owns the well and water 
distribution equipment. Members conveyed Water Co-Op-property to 
Grantee through quitclaim and warranty deeds; however, neither of these 
deeds granted Grantee membership to Water Co-Op. Grantee later erected a 
fence around his property that blocked Members’ access to a north-south 
road, an east-west road, and to Water Co-Op equipment. Members sued to 
quiet title and sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary and 
permanent injunctions to enjoin Grantee from blocking the roads. Members 
also sought a declaration that they were entitled to easements along the 
roads and that Grantee was not a member of Water Co-Op. Grantee 
counterclaimed, alleging that he was entitled to water from Water Co-Op 
because he acquired the land through a warranty deed from a Member of 
Water Co-Op and that membership ran with the land. The lower court 
found that Grantee must provide access to Water Co-Op equipment and was 
prohibited from interfering with the equipment. It also granted summary 
judgment to Members, holding that Grantee was not a Water Co-Op 
member and that the Members had a prescriptive easement for use of the 
roads because they had used them for more than ten years. Grantee 
appealed, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that neither of the deeds 
awarded Grantee membership, and the prescriptive easement that belonged 
to Members prohibited Grantee from blocking roads on his land. This is an 
unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be 
consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
 
California 
 
City of San Buenaventura v. United Water Conservation Dist., 406 P.3d 
733 (Cal. 2017). 
 
City brought suit seeking writs of mandate and administrative mandate 
along with reverse validation and declaratory relief against Water 
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Conservation District (“District”), challenging the constitutionality of 
District’s groundwater pumping charges to City and other operators for 
certain consolidated water years. District cross-claimed, seeking a 
declaratory judgment to uphold its charge. The district court issued a 
declaratory judgment and the writs of mandate, ordering District to refund 
City for certain years of charges. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court 
of California held that District’s groundwater charges fell outside the 
purview of Article IIID of the California Constitution as they were not 
“imposed . . . upon a parcel or upon a person as an incident of property 
ownership” within that phrase’s constitutional meaning, because in 
executing the groundwater pumping, District was not providing a service to 
City in its capacity as owner of the lands where the groundwater wells were 
located, but rather in its capacity as an extractor of groundwater from areas 
managed for the public’s benefit. The court determined that because 
District’s charge qualified as one imposed for a specific benefit given 
directly to the payor that is not given to those not charged, and because the 
charge did not exceed reasonable costs to the local government for 
conferring the benefit or privilege, the charge was exempt from the 
Constitutional definition of a “tax.” On that question, the court remanded 
the issue with instructions to examine the record for evidence that the 
charges in question carried a “reasonable relationship to the benefits of its 
conservation activities” as is constitutionally required. 
 
Living Rivers Council v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 223 Cal.Rptr.3d 703 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2017).  
  
Objector filed petition for writ of mandate to require Water Resources 
Control Board (“Board”) to rescind its approval of policy designed to 
maintain instream flows in certain coastal streams. The trial court denied 
the petition and Objector appealed. The appellate court affirmed, holding 
that a revised substitute environmental document was not misleading with 
respect to whether policy-induced increases in groundwater use would 
cause significant impacts; that such document adequately described 
subterranean stream delineations as potential, but unadopted, mitigation 
measure; and evidence was sufficient to support finding that subterranean 
stream delineations were infeasible as mitigation measure. This case was 
ordered not published; therefore, state court rules should be consulted 
before citing the case as precedent.  
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Pleasant Valley Cty. Water Dist. v. Fox Canyon Groundwater Mgt. Agency, 
No. 2d Civil No. B281425, 2017 WL 5589178 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 
2017). 
  
Water District sued groundwater management agency (“Agency”), seeking 
to invalidate an ordinance clarifying the rules for groundwater extraction 
surcharges (“Ordinance”). Agency was created to address groundwater 
overdrafts with the objective of balancing water supply and demand. Water 
District is a water purveyor and is a special district with its acreage all 
within land under Agency’s authority. Ordinance was created in response to 
the Governor’s 2014 declaration of a statewide drought emergency and 
sought to clarify which water sources are subject to a groundwater 
surcharge if not used efficiently by an agricultural operator. Water District 
contended that Agency lacked the statutory authority to consider river 
surface water use in calculating the groundwater extraction surcharge. The 
trial court found Agency’s ordinance as not exceeding its lawmaking 
authority and that the ordinance is categorically exempt from California 
Environmental Quality Act and does not violate the equal protection clause 
of the California constitution. Because the state legislature granted Agency 
with broad authority in adopting ordinances to preserve, protect, and 
enhance groundwater resources as well as the authority to implement 
conjunctive use objectives for groundwater management, the appellate 
court held that Agency’s control is not limited to only groundwater basins. 
While Agency was not primarily created to monitor river surface water use, 
the appellate court found the activity to be within the grant of Agency’s 
expressed and implied powers. In regard to the equal protection claim, the 
appellate court held that Water District failed to show how Ordinance 
treated Water District differently from similarly situated persons and that 
Agency had a rational basis for determinations based on the source of 
groundwater used for irrigation. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; 
therefore, state court rules should be consulted before citing the case as 
precedent. 
 
Monterey Coastkeeper v. Monterey Cty. Water Res. Agency, 226 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 592 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017). 
 
Program filed a petition for writ of mandate against Agency, claiming five 
causes of action. Program claimed that Agency violated the local Porter-
Cologne Water Quality Control Act (“Act”) by discharging waste into local 
water sources without filing a report on such discharge. Program also 
claimed violations by failure to comply with the Act’s requirements 
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regarding the waste discharge itself, and the water quality plan. Program 
also claimed that Agency breached its fiduciary and public duty through 
such actions and created a public nuisance. Since the State Water Board had 
already begun an investigation, but with no final action taken, the court 
relied on their information, determining that Agency was in fact a waste 
discharger. The court held that there was an administrative remedy which 
should have been pursued before filing petition for writ of mandate. 
Program could have asked the Regional Water Board to step in, as it is 
authorized to do under the Act, and order Agency to file the required 
discharge report, imposing civil repercussions if such an order was not 
complied with. The state and regional water boards have direct authority to 
manage water quality and waste discharge, so the grievance should have 
started with them, not the court system. However, the court found that the 
Act does allow for judicial review, despite Agency’s claim otherwise, 
because even though the State Water Board’s review of the Regional Water 
Board’s decision is discretionary, their denial of review triggers further 
judicial review. According to the record, Program never filed a petition 
requesting the State Water Board’s review of the Regional Water Board’s 
inaction. Thus, this court held that Program could not get “extraordinary 
relief” because it had not expended all administrative remedies.  
 
Santa Clara Waste Water Co. v. Cty. of Ventura Envtl. Health Div., 225 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 885 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017).  
 
In November 2014, an explosion at Operator’s facility led to a criminal 
investigation in which Health Division assisted in executing a search 
warrant. Health Division discovered nineteen 275-gallon totes and seven 
50-gallon drums of Petromax and determined that twenty-four of the totes 
and drums were hazardous because their high pH levels had accumulated 
over time. Because the district attorney’s office (“DA”) had already filed a 
criminal action against Operator, Health Division chose to use an informal 
enforcement action, which notifies the operator of noncompliance and puts 
in place an action and date for the correction, but it does not impose any 
sanctions. Operator sued Health Division arguing that Petromax was not 
hazardous waste and that it had a right to an administrative hearing to 
determine whether Petromax constituted hazardous waste. Health Division 
filed a motion to strike the petition as a “strategic lawsuit against public 
participation” (“Anti-SLAPP”). The trial court denied the motion. The 
appeals court reversed the denial, holding that Health Division made a 
prima facie showing that Operator’s cause of action arose from an act of 
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free speech in connection with a public issue and that Operator failed to 
carry its burden of establishing a probability of prevailing on its claim. 
 
Idaho 
 
Paslay v. A&B Irrigation Dist., 406 P.3d 878 (Idaho 2017). 
 
Landowners filed suit seeking injunctive relief and declaratory judgment 
against Irrigation District for diverting a portion of their water source to 
other property owners in the district. The district court granted District’s 
motion to dismiss on all counts—count I, which sought a declaratory 
judgment enforcing Landowners’ water rights, and count III, which sought 
injunctive relief for breach of fiduciary duty, were dismissed for lack of 
justiciability, and count II, which challenged the project’s assessment as a 
violation of Landowners’ property rights, was dismissed as being barred by 
res judicata. Landowners appealed, arguing that: (1) the legal standard used 
by the lower court in granting dismissal was improper, and (2) neither 
justiciability nor res judicata barred their claims. The Idaho Supreme Court 
affirmed the determination that counts I and II were not justiciable because 
their claim that District’s project will cause “dilution” of Landowners’ 
available water supply did not constitute an actual or threatened injury to 
Landowners. However, the court reversed and remanded the lower court’s 
decision to dismiss Landowners’ claim for declaratory relief on procedural 
grounds. 
 
Montana  
 
In re Scott Ranch, LLC, 2017 MT 230, 388 Mont. 509, 402 P.3d 1207. 
 
This water rights case involves tribal lands allotted to a deceased party, 
later converted to fee simple and procured by Purchaser. Purchaser sought 
associated water rights, but was denied by the Water Court because the 
court determined that the rights were preexisting, originating from the Crow 
Water Rights Compact, were exempt because they were for “livestock or 
individual use” and therefore required no adjudication. The Water Court 
said Purchaser could share in the collective allotted share of the Tribal 
Water Rights. On review, the Montana Supreme Court determined that 
these rights are ‘existing rights’ under the relevant statute because “[a]s the 
non-Indian successor-in-interest to allotment lands conveyed by a tribal 
member, [Purchaser] possesses Walton water rights as appurtenances to the 
lands it acquired.” Walton rights are non-tribal members’ “right[s] to share 
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in reserved waters.” However, the court held that the claims fell under the 
jurisdiction of state law, rather than Tribal Water Rights, since the water 
rights were obtained through the allocation of the converted land, not as 
part of the Crow Compact which created the shared rights. Additionally, the 
land was purchased by a private party and no longer held via trust by the 
government. Even though a claim filing deadline (that had long passed) was 
imposed by state law, it would have been impossible for Purchaser to 
comply with such a deadline, considering the date of sale. Therefore, the 
court reversed and remanded the claims, finding that the Water Court erred 
in deciding that these rights were still part of the collective Tribal Water 
Rights. It also offered instructions that Purchaser may still submit a claim, 
despite the past deadline. 
 
Quigley, 2017 MT 278, 389 Mont. 283, 405 P.3d 627 (Mont. 2017). 
  
Landowner and Neighbor brought suit against one another, asserting 
conflicting claims of ownership over irrigation water rights. Water Master 
based a report dividing the four rights on proportional ownership rights of 
the irrigated acres owned by each party. The case was appealed to the 
Supreme Court of Montana after the Water Court largely adopted Water 
Master’s report. Landowner contend that Water Master and the Water Court 
erred in failing to interpret a past decree to only include water rights where 
Neighbor put the water to beneficial use. The Montana Supreme Court 
ultimately held that Neighbor’s pleadings do not control the place of use of 
the rights decreed to Neighbor. The court affirmed the Water Court’s order. 
 
Nevada  
 
Bosta v. King, 404 P.3d 397 (Nev. Oct. 13, 2017). 
 
The district court denied a preliminary injunction and dismissed water 
rights owners’ (“Owners”) complaint in a water rights action. On appeal, 
Owners argued that State Engineer lacked authority to regulate well usage 
because: (1) percolating groundwater is private property, under which water 
lies; and (2) even if percolating groundwater was not private property, 
Owners were not “persons” within the meaning of the relevant state law. In 
response, the Supreme Court of Nevada disagreed with both contentions, 
finding that: (1) the Legislature, in the 1939 Water Act, determined 
percolating groundwater as belonging to the public; and (2) state law at 
issue does not expressly prove a separate definition of “person,” but instead 
expands another provision’s general definition of “person,” which owners 
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fall under. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the 
decision of the district court. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; 
therefore, state or federal court rules should be consulted before citing the 
case as precedent. 
 
State Eng’r v. Eureka Cty., 402 P.3d 1249 (Nev. 2017). 
 
Company filed many applications to amend the water usage in Valley. The 
State Engineer granted Company’s application. The State Engineer noted 
that the ruling would impact some of the senior water rights but that 
Company would be able to mitigate the impact. Company still had to 
prepare a monitoring, management, and mitigation plan before diverting the 
water. The County’s request for a judicial review was denied. Company and 
State Engineer argue that the district court exceeded its authority when it 
vacated the permits rather than remanding the case for further fact-finding. 
The Supreme Court of Nevada disagreed. The court stated that when it 
remands a case, “the district court ‘must proceed in accordance with the 
mandate and the law of the case as established on appeal.’” The court 
determined that State Engineer’s determination that Company could 
mitigate the preexisting water was not based on substantial evidence and 
therefore could not stand. At no point did the court direct the district court 
to remand the case for further fact-finding. Therefore, the district court 
acted consistent within the instructions of the Supreme Court of Nevada. 
The court affirmed the lower court because it complied with the direction of 
the Supreme Court of Nevada.  
 
New York  
 
Vill. of Woodbury v. Seggos, 65 N.Y.S.3d 76 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017). 
 
Village had been building a thirteen-mile long pipeline to tap into an 
aqueduct. Because authorization to withdraw water would not be granted 
unless Village proved that it had an adequate backup water source, Village 
acquired property in neighboring town (“Town”) that was suitable for a 
needed pump station and provided access to an abundant potential water 
supply. Village then applied to the Department of Environmental 
Conservation (“DEC”) for a permit to develop a well field at the Town. 
Village’s application was reviewed under the State Environmental Quality 
Review Act (“SEQRA”), and no adverse environmental impact was found. 
The water supply permit was further submitted and reviewed by DEC, and 
Village was issued a final permit in 2015. Interest Groups brought two 
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different claims seeking relief, including annulment of the water withdrawal 
permit and an injunction barring the withdrawal. DEC and Village moved 
to dismiss both claims on grounds that Intervenors lacked standing. The 
trial court found that the Intervenors lacked standing to bring the suit and 
further noted that even those parties’ challenges to the SEQRA 
determination were barred by res judicata and belied by “overwhelming 
documentary evidence,” and dismissed the petitions. On appeal, the 
appellate court affirmed for several of the Intervenors, but held those that 
were neighboring landowners and towns had standing to sue, but that the 
SEQRA challenge was time-barred, and the DEC had rational basis for 
granting the permit application and acted within its discretion in doing so. 
 
Ohio  
 
State ex rel. Dewine v. Osborne Co., 11th Dist. Lake No. 2016-L-091, 2017 
WL 4779213 (Oct. 23, 2017).   
 
State sued Operator alleging three causes of action; each alleged a violation 
of State’s Water Pollution Control Laws. State claimed that: (1) Operator 
failed to obtain certification from State’s EPA before engaging in certain 
activities along the river; (2) that Operator failed to obtain a construction 
storm water discharge permit before engaging in activities that disturbed the 
land along the river; and (3) that Operator polluted the river, without a 
permit, by discharging storm water into the river. Operator had been 
placing dredged material into the river, degraded certain portions of the 
river, and threatened other portions in order to increase water flow. 
Operator was also removing material from the center of the river and 
placing it on the water banks. The trial court found Operator personally 
liable. Operator appealed bringing four assignments of error. First, that the 
trial court wrongly interpreted that all of the work performed was without a 
permit; secondly and thirdly, that the trial court erred in assessing a civil 
penalty and awarding State injunctive relief beyond the scope necessary; 
and lastly, that the trial court erred in finding Operator personally liable. 
Resolving the first assignment of error, the appeals court found that while 
Operator’s actions violated other statutory provisions, State did not allege 
those provisions. The court remanded Operator’s second and third 
assignments of error based on the court’s resolution of the first assignment 
of error. Finally, the court held that the fourth assignment of error was 
without merit, because under State law, an individual may be held 
personally liable when the court finds “personal participation” in the 
unlawful act. 
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Oregon  
 
Willamette Water Co. v. Waterwatch of Or., Inc., 407 P.3d 923 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2017). 
 
Company applied for a permit to use public water for a quasi-public use. 
Commission proposed a conditional permit which Public Interest Group 
protested. An ALJ heard arguments and denied the application because the 
applicable law stated that projects to divert public water must be completed 
within five years of the grant of a permit, and Commission determined that 
the project would take over ten years to complete. Company appealed and 
alleged that: (1) Commission misconstrued the applicable law when it 
determined that Company had only five years to complete the project; (2) 
the ALJ disregarded a witness with contrary evidence to its determination 
that the project would take over ten years; and (3) Commission 
misconstrued applicable law when it determined that it was required to 
deny the application based on the lack of land use approvals for Company’s 
project. The appellate court held that Commission did not misconstrue 
applicable law to either the necessary time span to complete the project or 
to deny the application based upon the lack of approvals because the 
interpretations were made using the plain language of the statutes in 
question. The appellate court also held that the ALJ only disregarded 
objected-to portions of the witness’s testimony regarding the time Company 
would take to complete the project, so the evidence was otherwise 
completely taken in to consideration. The appellate court ruled that 
Commission did not err in denying the application. 
 
Texas  
 
Mt. Peak Spec. Util. Dist. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Texas, No. 03-16-00796-
CV, 2017 WL 5078034 (Tex. App. Nov. 2, 2017). 
  
Utility District sued the Public Utility Commission (“PUC”), seeking 
judicial review of PUC’s ruling concerning Utility District’s water service 
transmission to the City. PUC had previously granted City’s petition for 
expedited release of a portion of its property from the certificated service 
area of Utility District. Upon review of the district court, Utility District 
contended that the statutory requirements for expedited release had not been 
satisfied because City was in fact receiving water service from Utility 
District. Utility District also argued that PUC should not have approved the 
decertification petition as six and seven-tenths (“6.7”) acres of property 
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within Utility District’s certificated service area and owned by City was 
excluded from City’s petition. Ruling against Utility District, the district 
court affirmed PUC’s approval of City’s petition. The appellate court, the 
court affirmed the lower court’s ruling on all issues. With regard to the 
exclusion of the 6.7-acres, the court examined whether there are water 
facilities or lines committed to serving the property and ultimately held that 
City’s exclusion of the 6.7-acres from its petition is not a basis for reversing 
PUC’s approval. The court also held that City was not receiving water 
service by examining the evidence presented in the decertification 
proceedings. Because the existence of water lines near a property does not 
necessarily mean the area is receiving water service, the court found 
reasonable support to PUC’s fact-based determination affirming City’s 
argument. The court also held that PUC’s order does not conflict with a 
previous agency order since the agreement in question between Utility 
District and City was an agreement separate to the one approved by PUC. 
 
Utah  
 
Utah Stream Access Coal. v. Orange St. Dev., 2017 UT 82, No. 20150439-
SC, 2017 WL 5634226 (Utah Nov. 22, 2017). 
 
A group of citizens (“Group”) sued, alleging that a one-mile stretch of the 
river was navigable water and, therefore, should be open for recreation 
under the Public Waters Access Act (“Act”). Group sought only 
recreational use rights and no title determination to the waters. The trial 
court concluded that the disputed section of the river was navigable under 
the “navigability for title” standard set forth in federal “equal footing” law. 
It further accepted the testimony of Group’s expert showing regular 
commercial use of the river, including the use for transporting timber, 
which would be less economical on land. The trial court thus issued an 
injunction preventing landowners and state officers from interfering with 
the recreational use rights of the public on the stretch of river. Finally, the 
trial court concluded that the streambed below the water was held in title by 
the State, thus quieting title to the streambed although Group did not assert 
this claim. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court found that the trial court 
improperly quieted title to the streambed, that its improper reliance on 
federal law was harmless error, and that the evidence in the case was 
sufficient to support the trial court’s determination that the stretch of water 
was navigable under the Act. 
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Vermont  
 
TransCanada Hydro Ne. Inc. v. Town of Newbury, 2017 VT 117, No. 2016-
061, 2017 WL 6210911 (Vt. Dec. 8, 2017). 
 
Dam Owner (“Owner”) owns and operates a dam on the Connecticut River 
in Hartford, Vermont. The dam is downstream from Town, and Owner has 
flow easements that give it the right to flood land abutting the river in 
Town. Town had valued the flow easements at $1,532,211.00 for property 
tax purposes and Owner challenged the valuation arguing that it was 
unsupported by the admissible evidence. Owner argued that the value could 
not be based on comparable sales of flow easements because no evidence of 
comparable sales existed, and sale prices are influenced by the Owner’s 
right to take such easements by eminent domain. Owner and Town had 
expert appraisers analyze the surrounding land of the dam and evaluate the 
value of the possible flooding easements. Owner’s expert focused on the 
acres of land that were actually flooded, whether the flooding was directly 
influenced by the dam, and each flooded acre’s possible utility value. 
Town’s expert valued all the acres included in the easement as possible 
flooding spots and valued them all the same, resulting in a much higher 
value. The trial court concluded that the dam was, at any given point, 
always liable, at least in part, for all flooding and was able to find middle 
ground from both arguments and find a valuation in between the two 
experts’ findings – $1,532,211.00. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed, 
holding that the trial court could use the uniform per-acre value in 
appraising the value of flow easements and that Owner failed to rebut the 
presumption that Town’s valuation of flow easements was valid. 
  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss5/4
2018]        Recent Case Decisions 1259 
  
 
SELECTED LAND DECISIONS 
 
Agricultural Use 
 
E.D. North Carolina  
 
In re NC Swine Farm Nuisance Litig., No. 5:15-CV-00013-BR, 2017 WL 
5178038 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 8, 2017). 
 
Property Owners living near swine farms sued Farm Owner, seeking 
monetary damages for nuisance and negligence. Both parties filed several 
motions and cross motions for partial summary judgment and motions to 
seal. After determining that Property Owners lawfully occupied the affected 
properties, the district court denied Farm Owner’s motion for partial 
summary judgment. The court found as follows: (1) because the use of 
Property Owners’ lands as residences did not extend into an agricultural 
area and was in existence long before Farm Owner began his operations, 
and because Property Owners’ nuisance claims had nothing to do with 
changed conditions in the area, their claims were not barred by the state’s 
right-to-farm law and Property Owners were entitled to summary judgment 
on that defense; (2) the constant nature of the unpleasantness caused by the 
farm made the nuisance a recurring one, meaning Property Owners’ 
nuisance claim was not barred by the statute of limitations, but recovery 
was barred beyond the three years prior to filing suit; (3) Farm Owner 
presented sufficient evidence to preclude summary judgment against him 
on the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk; (4) 
because they owned or occupied their property lawfully and the annoyance 
and discomfort alleged flowed from the wrong purportedly created by Farm 
Owner, if Property Owners could establish a nuisance, they are entitled to 
recover damages for discomfort and annoyance; (5) evidence of Property 
Owners’ fear of disease or adverse health effects was not barred in support 
of their discomfort and annoyance claims; and (6) the question of punitive 
damages was to be decided at the end of Property Owners’ case in chief or 
after all evidence was heard. 
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California  
 
Citizen’s Voice St. Helena v. City of St. Helena, A146887, 2017 WL 
5167817 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 11, 2017). 
 
Interest Group and two citizens (together, “Interest Group” or “Group”) 
challenged an approved use permit for a wine production facility. The 
Group brought two causes of action: (1) violation of the California 
Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”) by failing to prepare an 
Environmental Impact Report (“EIR”); and (2) violation of planning and 
zoning laws. Interest group now appeals the denial of their challenge. City 
first argued that Interest Group’s appeal should fail because it failed to 
exhaust its administrative remedies. On this issue, the appellate court 
determined that the lower court erred in determining that the Group’s 
appeal to the City Council does not count as a sufficient attempt to exhaust 
administrative remedies because the hearing carried out by a planning 
commission included an appeal to the City Council. The court then 
determined an EIR was unnecessary because Group failed to provide any 
substantial evidence of a potential significant environmental impact after 
City presented mitigation measures which addressed the Group’s concerns. 
Finally, the plan for the winery did not violate City’s planning or zoning 
laws. The plan did not violate planning laws because the winery was not for 
a “[s]trictly tourist-serving retail” purpose, and that determination by the 
lower court was not unreasonable. Further, the winery plan did not violate 
City’s zoning law because Group failed to provide any authority 
demonstrating the zoning law was a categorical rule not subject to a 
previously established exception for “building[s] that existed prior to 1993” 
like the one at issue in this case. Therefore, despite the error by the lower 
court regarding the scope of attempted administrative remedies, there is no 
basis to accept Group’s two causes of action. The lower court was affirmed. 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules 
should be consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
 
Missouri 
 
Hill v. Mo. Dept. of Conservation, No. ED 105042, 2017 WL 4507991 
(Mo. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2017).  
 
Owners of hunting preserves and breeding operations (“Owners”) 
challenged amended regulations enacted by the Missouri Conservation 
Commission (“Commission”). The regulations were aimed at the captive 
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cervid – elk and deer – industry in an effort to manage the threat of Chronic 
Waste Disease (“CWD”) which can be fatal to the cervid population in the 
state. Owners sought to enjoin Commission from enforcing the regulations 
on the grounds that captive cervids were not “game” or “wildlife resources 
of the state” and that the regulations interfered with their right to farm. The 
trial court found all of the challenged amended regulations to be invalid and 
prohibited Commission from enforcing them. Commission appealed, 
alleging three points of error: (1) the trial court erred in entering judgment 
for Owners’ claim that Commission lacked authority to regulate captive 
cervids as “game” or “wildlife resources of the state” because the 
Commission does have constitutional authority to enact regulations 
concerning captive cervids that could pass CWD to the state’s non-captive 
cervids; (2) the trial court erred in entering judgment for Owners on their 
claim that the regulations violated their right to farm because Owners were 
not engaged in farming or ranching practices and therefore Commission 
could regulate Owners; and (3) alternatively, the trial court erred in 
enjoining enforcement under Owners’ right to farm claim because the 
injunction is overbroad and void as to non-parties. The appeals court held 
that it would reverse the trial court on points one and two. However, 
because of the general interest and importance of the questions involved, it 
transferred the case to the Missouri Supreme Court. 
 
Wisconsin 
 
Multerer v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, 2017 WI App 71, 378 Wis. 2d 327, 904 
N.W.2d 408. 
 
Landowners’ properties are subject to permanent wetland conservation 
easements under federal law preventing future farming on the land. 
According to the Wisconsin Administrative Code the properties are not 
distinguished of “agricultural use.” Without this distinction, Landowners 
cannot take advantage of agricultural property tax breaks. Landowners sued 
the Department of Revenue (“DOR”), challenging the validity of this 
definition, and alleging a violation of their state and federal equal protection 
rights and the Uniformity Clause of Wisconsin’s Constitution. Specifically, 
Landowners argue that they are similarly situated to, but treated differently 
than, owners of land that have temporary restrictions on agricultural use. 
They also alleged that the provision in question was promulgated without 
environmental review as required by the Wisconsin Environmental Policy 
Act (“WEPA”). The circuit court granted DOR’s motion for summary 
judgment and Landowners appeal. The appellate court affirmed. Finding 
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rational basis as the appropriate level of scrutiny the court held the 
legislature was reasonable in giving preferential tax treatment to land that 
can be put to agricultural use in the future, as it encourages such 
landowners to keep open the possibility to put their land to agriculture use 
at a later date Taxing land at preferential rates that cannot be returned to 
such production provides no incentive to Landowners to preserve their land 
for farmland, and this difference in goals provides a rational basis for 
excluding such land from the definition of “agricultural use” in the state 
code. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court 
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.  
 
Easements  
 
Tax Court  
 
Palmolive Bldg. Inv’rs, LLC. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 149 T.C. 18 
(2017). 
 
Company executed a conservation easement deed to preserve the exterior 
perimeter walls of its building’s façade. The deed prohibited Company 
from demolishing, removing, or altering the protected elements without 
permission from State’s preservation council (“Council”). At the time of the 
execution two mortgages encumbered the building. Before executing the 
deed with Council, Company secured agreements from both lenders to 
subordinate their mortgages in the property rights to enforce the purposes of 
the easements. The deed had provisions regarding the insurances and who 
must pay whom. During tax court proceedings, the court noted that in order 
to meet the perpetuity requirements, a property interest retained by the 
donor must also be subject to legally enforceable restrictions. The court 
looked at how a mortgage on the property affects whether a donation of 
easement on the property has a lasting value. The court found that the deed 
did not satisfy the perpetuity requirements under the tax code and the 
mortgage were not subordinated to the easement. Under the tax code “no 
deduction will be permitted … for an interest in property which is subject to 
a mortgage unless the mortgagee subordinates its rights in the property of 
the right of the qualified organization.” The property in this case was not 
free and clear, instead the owner borrowed money and used the property as 
collateral for his loans. The whole property was insured. Even though 
Company donated the façade easement, the façade continued to benefit 
Company and its lenders by supporting the insurance coverage. The court 
stated that where an owner subject to a mortgage and covered by insurance 
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seeks to donate a perpetual easement interest in a façade, the owner may not 
hold back an interest in it by using it as collateral for mortgage loans. The 
mortgagee’s right in the property must be subordinate to the interest of the 
donor. Therefore, the court held that because the requirements of the tax 
code were not satisfied at the time of the gift, the conversation easement is 
not protected in perpetuity.  
 
California  
 
S. Cal. Edison Co. v. Antelope Valley Water Storage, LLC, F072320, 2017 
WL 4532471 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2017). 
  
A water storage company (“Water Company”) challenged a trial court’s 
denial of its motion to dismiss an eminent domain complaint filed by a 
public utility company (“PUC”). Among other things, Water Company 
contends the trial court erred when it interpreted PUC’s easements over 
Water Company’s property as being exclusive and giving PUC the right to 
restrict Water Company’s use of the easement property. The appellate court 
affirmed the trial court decision, holding that the lower court correctly 
interpreted the easements to give PUC the power to limit or exclude Water 
Company’s proposed use of the easements. The easements in question 
expressly reserved certain rights to the property and prohibited the property 
owners from engaging in various activities the court reasoned. Specifically, 
per the easement Water Company cannot deposit any substance or material 
that, in PUC’s opinion, would endanger or interfere with PUC’s 
transmission lines, and, because water is a substance, and water banking it 
is an activity which PUC deemed dangerous to its transmission line 
activities, PUC had the right to preclude Water Company from using the 
property subject to the easements for water banking. This case is an 
unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be 
consulted before citing the case as precedent.  
 
Georgia  
PHH Invs. v. Dep't of Transp., 808 S.E.2d 431 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017). 
Landowner’s property, Parcel 6, is near Georgia Highway 400 and has a 
strip mall on it. Within that strip mall there is a smaller partial that is owned 
by Company. Company leases that parcel to Restaurant. No driveway 
existed when Restaurant opened and so it obtained an easement from Parcel 
6. In 2014, the Department of Transportation (“DOT”) started a project to 
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ease traffic flow at busy intersections. DOT filed petitions to condemn part 
of Parcel 6 including the easement that Restaurant owned. Company argued 
that the reduced access to the highways would impact its business and that 
it was entitled to recover diminution in market value. Company appealed 
the trial court’s finding that it could not recover the diminution in value of 
its contiguous parcel based on the partial taking of its easements over the 
adjoining condemned property. The appellate court affirmed the lower 
court. The court found that Company cannot recover consequential 
damages for Parcel 6 since it does not own it and its neighboring properties 
were not condemned.  
 
Kentucky  
 
Majestic Oaks Homeowners Ass’n. Inc. v. Majestic Oaks Farms, Inc., 530 
S.W.3d 435 (Ky. 2017). 
 
Homeowners sued Developer after Developer continued to utilize an 
easement created by a declaration in Developer’s original conveyance of 
land to Homeowners, revocable only by a sixty-seven percent majority vote 
by Homeowners. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The 
trial court granted Developer’s motion, and the appellate court affirmed. 
The Kentucky Supreme Court first began by noting that this type of 
defeasible easement is recognized in Kentucky, and ends when a specified 
action occurs. Finding that easements are a type of restriction mentioned in 
the original conveyance from Developer to Homeowners, it was a revocable 
easement in areas of both property law and contract law. Therefore, the 
court held that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment to 
Developer, and instead entered summary judgment for Homeowners. 
 
Michigan 
 
Collins v. Schmidt, No. 336967, 2017 WL 4798253 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 
24, 2017). 
 
Landowners had an appurtenant easement across a road that went through 
Neighbor’s property. Neighbor built a garage on his property and re-graded 
the road to have access to the garage from the road. Landowners claimed 
that the re-grading unilaterally modified the easement and caused them to 
lose rights to their easement because of the degree that must be climbed. It 
also caused them to lose the ability to move their mobile home to their 
property. The trial court heard oral argument over the issues for two days 
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and decided that Neighbor had not modified the easement and had not 
unreasonably interfered with the easement because the road was still 
passable after the modifications. The appellate court affirmed that there was 
no modification to the easement due to Neighbor’s use of the property, but 
vacated and remanded on the issue of whether Landowner’s mobile home 
can be transported to their property because according to the easement, 
Neighbors may not interfere with Landowners’ rights to use the road for 
such. On appeal, Landowners also brought up an issue of denial of due 
process because the trial court did not rule on trespass from soil from the re-
grading being deposited upon their property, but the issue was not 
preserved for appeal and was not specifically brought before the trial court 
in the pleadings, so the appellate court held that there was no denial of due 
process. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court 
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.  
 
Douglass v. Barrett, No. 334352, 2017 WL 5759780 (Mich. App. Ct. Nov. 
28, 2017). 
 
Landowner 1 sued Landowner 2 over the use of two driveways, one gravel 
and the other paved. The gravel driveway ran on both Landowners’ 
properties. The lower court ruled in favor of Landowner 1 regarding the 
gravel driveway because of the doctrine of acquiescence. Further, the lower 
court determined that Landowner 2’s claim against Landowner 3 should be 
denied because Landowner 3 had an easement appurtenant which burdened 
Landowner 2’s property. Landowner 2 blocked access to the gravel 
driveway, forcing Landowner 1 to use a dirt two-track to access his home. 
Landowner 2 further claimed that it had maintained and used the gravel 
driveway for twenty-eight years and a witness (Landowner 1’s neighbor) 
testified Landowner 1’s long-time use of the gravel driveway. Despite 
Landowner 2’s contention, the appellate court determined that Landowner 1 
properly demonstrated acquiescence for the statutory period (fifteen years) 
over the gravel driveway. This was because Landowner 1 demonstrated by 
a preponderance of the evidence that it had the exclusive right to the 
driveway for over two decades—the testimony was sufficient and the court 
deferred to the lower court’s factual finding. What’s more, Landowner 2 
failed to provide any authority for its proposition that the statute of frauds 
should be applied. Regarding the dispute between Landowners 2 and 3, the 
appellate court determined that the lower court did not err in its conclusion 
that there should be termination of the right-of-way easement along 
Landowner 3’s property line. This was because an easement appurtenant 
was found and no evidence was submitted to the lower court that there was 
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“a merger of [Landowner 3’s] parcels, abandonment of the easement, or 
termination of that easement.” This is an unpublished opinion of the court; 
therefore, state court rules should be consulted before citing the case as 
precedent. 
 
Gunther v. Apap, No. 333169, 2017 WL 4654975 (Mich. App. Oct. 17, 
2017). 
 
Lakefront Property Owners brought suit against Backlot Property Owners, 
seeking a permanent injunction in regard to a pathway and boating activity 
in front of Lakefront Property Owners’ homes. The trial court granted 
summary disposition to Backlot Property Owners, holding that Lakefront 
Property Owners lacked standing because Lakefront Property Owners did 
not have a property interest in the pathway used by Backlot Property 
Owners to access the lake. Lakefront Property Owners argue that Backlot 
Property Owners possess an interest only in a right of way over the strip 
solely for pedestrian purposes without any riparian rights allowing Backlot 
Property Owners to construct a dock and keep boats in the water on a long 
term basis. On appeal, Lakefront Property Owners argued that they 
themselves own the nine-foot strip of land in question. Alternatively, 
Lakefront Property Owners argue that, even if they themselves do not own 
the strip, Lakefront Property Owners’ riparian property rights are affected 
since Backlot Property Owners activities extend beyond the strip and onto 
bottomlands owned by Lakefront Property Owners. Citing Michigan law, 
which holds that a right of way for pedestrian access does not extend to 
riparian rights, the appellate court held that Lakefront Property Owners’ 
lack of apparent ownership of the strip is not dispositive. Thus, the 
appellate court examined, more broadly, whether Backlot Property Owners’ 
activities give rise to a trespass or a nuisance with respect to Lakefront 
Property Owners’ undisputed riparian rights and property interest. The 
appellate court ultimately held that Lakefront Property Owners should be 
allowed to amend their complaint to add a claim for nuisance and a claim to 
quiet title to their riparian property. This is an unpublished opinion of the 
court; therefore, state court rules should be consulted before citing the case 
as precedent.  
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Mississippi 
 
Mayton v. Oliver, No. 2015–CA–01875–COA, 2017 WL 5907555 (Miss. 
Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2017). 
 
Landowners sued Neighbor, alleging that Neighbor had violated a 
restrictive covenant and interfered with express or prescriptive drainage 
easements when Neighbor blocked a PVC pipe that emptied water from 
Landowners’ properties onto Neighbor’s. The trial court found for 
Neighbor, and decided that Landowners had failed to establish the existence 
of either an express or prescriptive easement. Therefore, Landowners 
claims for relief for damages were denied. On appeal, the appellate court 
affirmed the trial court’s decision that Landowners had not established that 
an easement existed.  
 
Montana  
 
Edmiston v. Gerken, 2017 MT 255N, 404 P.3d 709 (Table).  
 
Landowners obtained an easement through a sale of land from the previous 
owner and from previous owners of the adjoining tracks of land. The 
easement stated that it was “intended to be a driveway to serve Tracts 44 
and 37 and [was] not intended to establish or create a roadway, easement, 
or travel corridor to serve any other Tract or property other than that 
described herein.” The easement also included a provision regarding gates: 
“No gate or obstruction shall be placed over, through, or across the 
easement granted . . . without the prior written consent of the owners of 
each such tracts.” Landowners purchased Tract 37. After granting 
Landowners the easement, the seller sold Tract 44 to the new owner of the 
adjoining tracks (“Neighbors”). Landowners subsequently built a gate 
without prior consent from Neighbors or the previous owner and placed 
timber and brush from their property on to Neighbors’ land. Neighbors sued 
Landowners claiming that the gate obstructed their use of the easement to 
access parts of their land and that the timber’s placement was a nuisance. 
The lower court found that the timber and brush pile was a nuisance and 
that the construction of a gate required permission from Neighbors and the 
previous owner. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding 
that the easement required permission to build a gate and that the purpose 
of using the easement as a driveway would be frustrated if any tract owner 
could erect a gate blocking the easement without obtaining permission from 
the remaining tract owners. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; 
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therefore, state court rules should be consulted before citing the case as 
precedent. 
 
New Jersey 
 
Lake Grinnell Ass’n v. Post, No. A-3224-15T2, 2017 WL 4818718 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 26, 2017).  
 
Landowners own a lakefront residence and enjoy an appurtenant easement 
for use of the lake. A lake association (“Association”) issued upon 
Landowners an order to pay a sum of money as their pro rata share of 
maintenance fees for the lake and a dam. After refusing to pay, Association 
brought a collection suit, demanding judgment for the amount owed, plus 
interest, fees, and costs. The trial court granted Association’s motion for 
summary judgment based upon the complaint and several certifications 
which were entered on Association’s behalf. Landowners appealed, and the 
appellate court reversed and remanded. The court concluded that the motion 
record did not show there was no genuine issue as to any material fact 
challenged, the summary judgment standard. The court further reasoned 
that the record did not support the trial court’s finding that the fees the 
Association charged Landowners were reasonable. Summarily, the court 
held that on the summary judgment record, there were inadequate facts 
from which a court can analyze and resolve the equitable considerations 
underlying the parties’ contentions. This is an unpublished opinion of the 
court; therefore, state court rules should be consulted before citing the case 
as precedent.  
 
New York  
 
GMMM Westover LLC v. N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp., 63 N.Y.S.3d 754 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2017). 
 
Utility Corporation appealed the trial court’s ruling that a reciprocal 
easement agreement (“REA”) was still in place and, thus, Utility 
Corporation was required to vacate Power Plant Operator’s (“Operator”) 
facilities. The appellate court affirmed, holding that Utility Corporation was 
required to vacate Operator’s premises because a plain reading of the REA 
provided that Utility Corporation was required to have severed its 
transmission facilities from the premises no later than a previous date. 
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Pennsylvania 
 
Gravel Hill Enters. v. Lower Mount Bethel Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 172 
A.3d 754 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017). 
 
Owners purchased land in 2008 after previous owner defaulted on a federal 
load. In 2014, Owners filed an application with the Township Zoning 
Hearing Board (“Board”) seeking variance to permit the operation of a 
stump shredder and grinder to produce mulch and top soil. Neighboring 
property owners (“Intervenors”) appeared at the hearing to oppose Owners’ 
application. Board denied Owner’s application, stating that the proposed 
use would be detrimental to the public welfare, have a negative impact on 
the character of the neighborhood, and did not constitute the minimum 
variance to afford relief. Owners appealed. In 2015, Intervenors filed a 
petition to intervene with the trial court, and Owners filed an answer 
opposing the petition asserting that it was untimely, Intervenors’ interests 
were already adequately represented by Board, and granting the petition 
would cause undue delay to the resolution of the matter at hand. The trial 
court, on October 30, 2015, granted Intervenors’ petition to intervene. In 
November 2015, the trial court approved a settlement agreement and 
adopted it as an order, to which Intervenors appealed, arguing that the trial 
court had abused its discretion in approving the settlement. On appeal, the 
appellate court held that: (1) Intervenors did not waive their right to an 
appeal; (2) Intervenors were not deprived of due process; and (3) the trial 
court did abuse its discretion in approving the settlement. Accordingly, the 
court affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court order.  
 
Other Land Issues – Federal  
 
Federal Claims  
 
Balagna v. United States, Nos. 14–21L/16–405L, 2017 WL 4416820 (Fed. 
Cl. Oct. 5, 2017). 
 
Landowners sued Government alleging an improper taking of land that 
abutted a railroad right-of-way. The court reviewed cross-motions for 
summary judgement involving several issues, including: (1) Government’s 
contention that the railroad owned portions of property underlying the 
railroad corridor; (2) Government’s contention that the issuance of a Notice 
of Interim Trail Use (“NITU”) did not result in a taking of access to certain 
properties; and (3) Government’s claim that it had not taken the property of 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
1270 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 3 
  
 
two municipal corporations. The court concluded that Government was 
entitled to summary judgement on all three claims. The court determined 
that: (1) Illinois state law provided that the railroad owns the part of a 
railroad corridor crossing Landowners’ properties; (2) that Illinois law 
guaranteed Landowners a right of access to property, and, thus, the issuance 
of an NITU does not affect those state law crossing rights; and (3) that the 
state consented to use of the Municipal properties as a trail.  
  
Other Land Issues – State  
 
Iowa  
 
C & D Mount Farms Corp. v. R & S Farms, Inc., No. 16-1586, 2017 WL 
4570434 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2017).  
 
This case involved a berm that separated a dominant estate owner’s 
(“Landowner-1”) farmland from the servient owner’s (“Landowner-2”) 
farmland. In 2014, Landowner-1 obtained a permit from the Iowa 
Department of Natural Resources to increase the berm’s height. 
Landowner-2 sued Landowner-1 alleging that the berm raised the 
elevations of Landowner-1’s land and caused excess water to flow onto and 
remain on Landowner-2’s land. Landowner-2 brought claims for nuisance, 
trespass, and breach of common law and statutory duty. The lower court 
concluded that the berm did not create a nuisance or trespass because the 
level of water flow would be the same whether the berm existed or not. 
Testimony from both Landowners’ experts established that Landowner-2’s 
land would always receive water before Landowner-1’s, regardless of 
whether Landowner-1’s land receives water. Additionally, because the 
berm and ditch kept Landowner-1’s land dry while also draining 
Landowner-2’s land, and because Landowner-2 acknowledged the 
existence of the berm prior to Landowner-2’s acquisition of the land, 
Landowner-2 failed to prove that Landowner-1 had abandoned the 
prescriptive easement. Therefore, the court concluded that Landowner-2 
failed to prove that Landowner-1 violated common law or statutory duties. 
The lower court concluded that the berm did not increase the area of 
Landowner-2’s land affected by floodwater. The court affirmed the lower 
court’s conclusion that no nuisance or trespass occurred. Landowner-2 then 
sought injunctive relief to prevent Landowner-1 from increasing the height 
of the berm. The court concluded that there was no apparent invasion or 
threatened invasion of a right.  
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Kansas 
 
Jenkins v. Chi. Pac. Corp., 403 P.3d 1213 (Kan. 2017). 
 
Landowner sued to quiet title to real property that a now-abandoned railway 
once ran through. Landowner traced her ownership to a deed which 
conveyed the lots in question to a railroad company (“Railroad”). After 
Railroad abandoned the railway, it quitclaimed its interest to a company 
that eventually quitclaimed its interest to Landowner. The court considered 
whether the deed expressly or impliedly conveyed the property for use as a 
right of way. If the deed conveyed the property for use as a right of way to 
the railroad company, the deed would have only granted an easement that 
would revert to the original landowners once the railway was abandoned, 
because railroads who receive property in this manner only receive an 
easement from the deed. If the deed did not expressly or impliedly convey 
the property for use as a right of way, or if it indicated no specific use by a 
railway, absolute title would have been conveyed. The district court entered 
summary judgement against Landowner, finding that the deed conveying 
the property to the railroad described the property in a manner that could be 
construed as a right of way. Therefore, only an easement was granted, and it 
reverted back to the original landowners when the railway was abandoned. 
As a result, when Railroad quitclaimed its interest to its successor company 
who quitclaimed to Landowner, Railroad deeded land that it did not legally 
own. The Supreme Court of Kansas agreed with the lower courts that the 
conveyance to Landowner from Railroad’s successor was in error since the 
deed had conveyed only an easement to Railroad, not a grantable estate.  
 
Louisiana  
 
Thompson v. FRF Properties, 2017-0152 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/2/17); 229 
So.3d 598. 
 
Landowners of Lot A had ancestors in title who created a servitude in favor 
of Lot B (an adjacent lot owned by Company) “for the purpose of 
maintaining a driveway to provide access to [Lot B].” The servitude 
driveway sat on both Lots. Landowners began a dispute with a resident of 
Company’s four-plex regarding where the resident parked her vehicle. After 
this dispute began, Landowners claimed that they built a fence on the Lot B 
side of the driveway and that the driveway was not used to access the rear 
of the property—the original intent of the servitude. The lower court ruled 
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in favor of Landowner, terminating the servitude for nonuse. Company 
makes two arguments on appeal: (1) it provided sufficient evidence 
demonstrating use which would overcome the required ten years of nonuse 
for termination, and (2) the lower court’s dismissal of some uses of the 
servitude as “illegal uses,” which do not quality as ‘use’ for termination 
purposes. The appellate court agreed with Company’s first argument 
because the lower court did not have any factual basis to come to its 
decision. Specifically, one of Company’s witnesses testified that he saw 
people use the driveway routinely to access Lot B for thirty-four of the 
forty years he lived in the four-plex on Lot B. The court also determined 
this argument is moot because the lower court did not terminate the 
servitude on this ground. Finally, the court determined that, given the 
language of the original servitude (use of the word “access” to Lot B), it’s 
purpose is for passage to the Lot, not just the rear of the lot. Therefore, 
because the driveway was used to access Lot B, the lower court’s judgment 
was reversed. 
 
Minnesota  
 
Resolution Setting Forth Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law & Order 
Denying S. M. Hentges & Sons, Inc. & Jordan Gravel, LLC Application for 
an Interim Use Permit for Aggregate Mining & Processing Operation in 
Sand Creek Twp., No. A16-1768, 2017 WL 5242456 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 
13, 2017). 
 
Developer challenged County’s denial of an application for an interim use 
permit to operate an aggregate mine on a parcel of land that allowed for 
mining as an interim use. Developers proposed a mine that would be 
located above and below the water table and would require a large 
groundwater pond in the center of the parcel and around a maximum of 110 
round trips per day of mine-related truck traffic. The surrounding 
landowners operated water wells that drew from the aquifer. Additionally, 
the parcel in question was located in a floodplain, which historically 
flooded multiple times per year. County claimed that the wells would be 
negatively impacted by floodwaters entering the aquifer via the pond and 
that, in addition to financial security for well replacements, Developer 
should be responsible for monitoring and mitigation of water aesthetics. 
County ultimately denied the application as it felt that the project would 
have a negative impact on public roadways, water wells, and the public 
health due to the potential impact the project could have on the safety and 
aesthetic of water from the aquifer. The court reviewed Developer’s claim 
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that denial of the application by County was arbitrary and capricious 
because the County’s findings were not supported in the record and 
negative impacts of the project could be remedied by imposing permit 
conditions. The court found that County was justified in denying the permit 
because they had a rational basis supported by the record to deny 
Developer’s application. Therefore, the denial was not arbitrary and 
capricious. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state 
court rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
 
New York  
 
In re New Creek Bluebelt, Phase 3, 65 N.Y.S.3d 552 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2017).  
 
Landowner sought compensation for property, which had been designated 
as wetlands, that was acquired by City for a stormwater management 
project. After concluding that Landowner had established a reasonable 
probability that the burden of the wetlands regulations on the property 
would constitute an unconstitutional taking, the trial court awarded 
Landowner an incremental amount above the regulated value of the 
property. City appealed, arguing that a purchaser of property that is already 
subject to wetlands regulations is barred from pursuing a regulatory takings 
claim. The appellate court affirmed for several reasons. First, because there 
was no showing that the regulation was a background principle of state law, 
the reasonable probability incremental increase rule may still be applied 
when valuing regulated wetlands property taken by condemnation. Second, 
because a diminution in value, along with prohibition on development of 
the property, was effectuated by the regulations, Landowner established 
that there was a reasonable probability that the burden of the wetlands 
regulations on the property would constitute a regulatory taking. Finally, 
because the incremental amount awarded by the trial court was not 
supported by sufficient evidence or satisfactorily explained, the court 
reduced the amount awarded based upon market data and remitted for entry 
of an appropriate final decree.   
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Ohio  
 
Bosky Grp., LLC v. Columbus & Ohio River R.R. Co., Fifth Dist. 
Muskingum, No. CT2017–0027, 2017 WL 4786758 (Oct. 19, 2017).  
 
Railroad appealed the trial court’s decision granting Property Owner 
summary judgment on its claim that Railroad was required build a rail 
crossing on Property Owner’s lot pursuant to an agreement made between 
Railroad and a prior property owner. The court determined the issue in the 
case was whether the promise contained in the prior agreement to construct 
a rail crossing was binding on Railroad after the property had since been 
purchased by Property Owner. The court found that the trial court did not 
err in finding that a right to a rail crossing runs perpetually with the land. 
The court determined that the intent of the parties alone is dispositive to 
determining whether an easement, such as a rail crossing, runs with a piece 
of land. In this case, the court determined that it was the intention of the 
parties when the agreement was signed in 1890 that the easement would be 
perpetual in nature, therefore, Railroad was obligated to construct a rail 
crossing on Property Owner’s land. 
 
Pennsylvania  
 
UGI Utilities, Inc. v. City of Reading, No. 499 M.D. 2015, 2017 WL 
5580066 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Nov. 21, 2017).  
 
Utility Company sued City seeking a declaratory judgment that certain city 
ordinances were invalid and sought to permanently enjoin City from 
enforcing those ordinances. Utility Company argued that an ordinance that 
imposed restrictions on the location of gas meters in historic districts was 
preempted by state code. Utility Company moved for partial summary 
judgment on this ground. The court held that City’s ordinance was 
preempted and could not be applied to the regulated utility. The court found 
that: (1) the regulatory code of the state governs itself; (2) the public utility 
commissions have exclusive authority over the regulation of public utility 
facilities; and (3) the local ordinance conflicted with the code of the state. 
Therefore, the court granted partial summary judgment to Utility Company 
and enjoined City from enforcing its ordinance.  
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South Dakota 
 
Long v. State, 2017 S.D. 79, 904 N.W.2d 502. 
 
State constructed a highway with culverts that could only withstand up to a 
certain amount of rainfall, but had a twelve and one-half percent chance of 
being exceeded in any given year. On July 30, 2010, the culverts capacity 
was exceeded and runoff flooded Landowners’ properties. Landowners 
sued State and City for inverse condemnation. Landowners and City came 
to a settlement, but the case was heard against State at the appellate court. 
State sought for City to either contribute or indemnify it for any judgment 
against it, which the court denied because State did not show that City was 
responsible for the property damage. The court granted relief to 
Landowners and State appealed to the Supreme Court of South Dakota. On 
appeal, State contended that the appellate court erred on the issues of 
whether the: (1) claims were barred by sovereign immunity; (2) highway 
construction caused of the property damage; (3) State was entitled to 
contribution or indemnification against City; and (4) State had a drainage 
easement over the damaged property. The South Dakota Supreme Court 
held that: (1) State did not have sovereign immunity against the claim 
because the claim was grounded in the State’s constitution; (2) the highway 
construction and failed culverts were the proximate cause of Landowners’ 
property damage and such was established conclusively by Landowners’ 
expert witnesses; (3) State was not entitled to contribution or 
indemnification because State did not prove that City was also responsible 
for the property damage although Landowners would be paid twice for their 
property values from both City and State; and (4) State did not argue over 
the issue of a drainage easement at trial so State could not now raise the 
issue. The court affirmed the findings of the lower court.  
 
Tennessee 
 
Lutzak v. Phoenix Am. Dev. Partners, L.P., No. M2015-02117-COA-R3-
CV, 2017 WL 4685300 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 18, 2017). 
 
Property Owner sued Developer, seeking a declaratory judgment that 
restrictive covenants governing Developer’s adjacent subdivision did not 
apply to Property Owner’s undeveloped property. On cross-motions for 
summary judgment, the lower court held that the undeveloped property was 
not covered by the express terms of the Declaration of Covenants, which 
governed the property to which the restrictive covenants applied. In doing 
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so, the court rejected Developer’s argument that chain of title extended the 
covenants to the undeveloped property. The court also refused to impose 
the restrictive covenants as implied negative reciprocal easements because 
Developer expressly chose to retain a right to deviate from the initial plan 
by altering the property contained within the subdivision and subjecting 
additional property to the restrictive covenants in the declaration. 
Reviewing the lower court’s decision de novo, the appellate court affirmed 
both the lower court’s decisions and its reasoning. 
 
Texas 
 
Dragon v. Trial, No. 04-16-00758-CV, 2017 WL 5162180 (Tex. App. Nov. 
8, 2017).  
  
In 1932, the property at issue—237 acres of land—was conveyed in equal 
shares to seven siblings owning an undivided 1/7th interest in the 
property. One sibling signed and recorded a deed conveying one-half (½) of 
all his right, title and interest in and to the property to his wife 
("Wife"). Purchasers purchased the 237 acres from the still-living siblings 
in 1992, following which Wife's husband died. Under the Gift Deed, Wife 
was the independent executrix of the estate and trustee of her husband's 
Trial Trust. Wife continued to accept and endorse payments made for the 
purchase of the property and then died. Under Wife's will, her Sons 
received the corpus of the trust estate, which included a mineral reservation 
that expired after fifteen years, at which point the mineral estate vested in 
Purchasers. As oil and gas production continued, the Lessee paid a portion 
of the royalties to Sons. Purchasers filed suit against Sons, alleging breach 
of contract (the 1992 Deed), estoppel by deed, trespass to try title by 
limitations, suit to quiet title by limitations, and promissory 
estoppel, arguing that in the 1992 Deed, each sibling purported to convey 
100% of their 1/7th interest and not merely a portion of their interest. The 
court held in favor of Purchasers, reasoning that because the 
sibling conveyed one-half of all his interest to Wife and thus did not 
actually own a full 1/7th interest in the land, he breached the warranty 
contained in the 1992 Deed "at the very time and execution of the deed" 
because he purported to convey what he did not own. The court also held 
that Sons were remainder beneficiaries of the estate and trust, and, 
therefore, bound by the recitals in the 1992 Deed and estopped from 
asserting title to any interests in contradiction to their father's duty to 
defend Purchasers against all claims to all that certain parcel or tract of 
land.  
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Virginia  
 
Woolford v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 806 S.E.2d 398 (Va. 2017).  
 
The Department of Taxation ("Department") rescinded $4,900,000.00 in 
land preservation tax credits that it had previously awarded to Landowner, 
citing Landowner's speculative analysis, conflicting data, lack of 
qualifications, and failure to meet the requirements of the State’s 
Code. The trial court sustained the decision, reasoning that the appraiser 
that Landowner hired was not a qualified appraiser within the statutory 
meaning, noting that he was not formally educating in appraising 
minerals, specifically the sand and gravel market. Landowner appealed. The 
Virginia Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court, holding that the 
appraiser hired by Landowner was a qualified appraiser. It reasoned that the 
appraiser was qualified by virtue of his experience in evaluating properties 
that contained sand and gravel deposits, and that the record unequivocally 
showed that he expended considerable effort in learning about sand and 
gravel mines in general and about the local and regional market for those 
products in particular. The court also noted that unless Department could 
conclude in good faith that the value of the conservation easement 
Landowner donated to the Virginia Outdoors Foundation is zero, it would 
need to award Landowner tax credits for the fair market value of the 
donation.  
 
West Virginia  
Tex. E. Transmission, LP v. W. Va. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 807 S.E.2d 802 
(W. Va. 2017).  
Coal Company claims ownership of certain coal reserves. It further 
contends that the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection 
(“WVDEP”) issued a mining permit authorizing expiration, development, 
and extraction of coal. Coal Company submitted a substance control plan as 
part of the permit revision application. transmission and gas companies 
(“Companies”) objected to Coal Company’s permit revision. A public 
hearing was held and WVDEP approved the permit revision application. 
Companies appealed the revision to the circuit claiming a defect because 
Coal Company failed to conduct the mining operations in a way that would 
protect the Companies’ pipeline, and failed to specify that subsidence 
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control plan measure would be taken to protect Companies pipeline from 
damage. The court agreed with Coal Company, and Companies appealed 
again to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. Companies argued 
that Coal Company failed to meet the requirement of demonstrating that its 
permit revision application complied with the West Virginia Utility 
Protection Standard. The court noted the Utility Protection Standard is a 
performance one and should not be confused with application requirements 
for pre-mining permits and permit revisions. Under state law each applicant 
for underground mining permit must contain a subsidence control plan. 
This plan must contain a survey that identifies structures and give a 
narrative whether substance could cause material damage or diminution of 
value. Companies argued that Coal Company failed to comply with this 
requirement by failing to include a narrative indicating whether or not 
subsidence could cause damage and the minimization steps it would take. 
The court noted that the state law used phrases include which demonstrates 
examples not giving an exclusive list. Regarding the pipeline, Coal 
Company did contain a narrative describing the substance control plan. 
Furthermore, it set out the action it would take thus meeting the necessary 
requirements. The court recognized that the “[regulation] may not be 
interpreted to be less stringent than its federal counterpart.” The court held 
“that [state statute] does not abrogate state common law with respect to 
subjacent support waivers contained within coal severance deeds.” 
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SELECTED ELECTRICITY DECISIONS 
Renewable Generation  
 
First Circuit  
 
Allco Renewable Energy Ltd. v. Mass. Electric Co., 875 F.3d 64 (1st Cir. 
2017). 
 
Solar Facilities Developer sued Electric Company, seeking to compel 
Electric Company to purchase power from Solar Facilities Developer at a 
negotiated rate rather than under a lower-priced standardized rate. Under 
the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 ("PURPA"), Solar 
Facilities Developer argued that the state-approved standard power 
purchase rate offered by Electric Company was unenforceable. The 
Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities denied Solar Facilities 
Developer's petition, holding that Electric Company's offer had been both 
reasonable and consistent with its own regulations. While Solar Facilities 
Developer could have sued the state utility regulatory agency for a PURPA 
violation, the district court denied Solar Facilities Developer’s attempt to 
sue Electric Company and granted Electric Company’s motion for summary 
judgment. The First Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately held that, because 
there is no express or implied private right of action for initiating suit in its 
statutory language, PURPA does not authorize claims between electric 
utility companies and cogeneration facilities. The appellate court 
additionally noted that Electric Company had never previously agreed to 
any specific cost rate with Solar Facilities Developer. The court held that 
Solar Facilities Developer failed to show that Congress had unequivocally 
conferred a private right of action for qualifying facilities against utilities to 
enforce PURPA's must-buy provision. Rather than for a qualifying facility 
such as Solar Facilities Developer to bring private action against an electric 
utilities company, the qualifying facility may file a petition with the state 
commission and appeal any potential adverse decision in state court. 
 
N.D. California  
 
Winding Creek Solar LLC v. Peevey, No. 13–CV–04934–JD, 2017 WL 
6040012 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2017).  
 
Solar energy provider (“Provider”) sued the Commissioners of the 
California Public Utilities Commission (“CPUC”) arguing that as three 
CPUC orders conflicted with federal law they violated the Supremacy 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
1280 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 3 
  
 
Clause of the United States’ Constitution, and thus Provider should not 
have to follow them. Provider sought declaratory and injunctive relief from 
a program established by CPUC orders called “Re-Mat” (Renewable 
Market-Adjusting Tariff), which regulates the terms on which utility 
companies must purchase power from alternative energy facilities, like 
Provider. Following a one-day bench trial, the court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Provider. The court reasoned that the Re-Mat program 
violated the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act and was thus in conflict 
with federal law. Accordingly, the court granted Provider the injunctive and 
declaratory relief it requested, but nothing more. This case has since been 
appealed, but there is no decision from the higher court as of publication. 
 
Rates  
 
Maryland 
 
Wash. Gas Light Co. v. Md. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 172 A.3d 927 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 2017). 
 
Utility Company appealed lower court’s affirmation of Commission’s 
denial of some parts of a proposed strategic infrastructure development plan 
(“Plan”). Utility Company claimed that Commission relied on its 
misinterpretation of a state code in making its determination. Commission 
should have instead, Utility Company argues, allowed for recovery of some 
expenses for infrastructure improvements that would ultimately benefit the 
public. In contrast with other “rate-making” cases, however, the proposed 
Plan incorporated a mechanism for funding derived from a local law, and 
the funds derived under that law operated differently. Such funds were only 
eligible for projects within the state, even if some outside-state projects 
ultimately benefited the same state long-term in a less direct way through 
the company’s development. This court examined the Commission’s 
determination and found Utility Company’s arguments unpersuasive, 
entertaining only two of the three (dismissing Utility Company’s policy 
argument). The court determined that the statute must be read in its entirety 
to appropriately discern the legislature’s meaning, which supports 
Commission’s interpretation. Additionally, the court found that the 
legislative history, with emphasis on comments regarding infrastructure 
improvement using these types of funds within the state of Maryland, 
pointed to an intent to use those funds for projects within the state. 
Therefore, the court affirmed Commission’s decision, holding that “the 
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STRIDE law's accelerated cost recovery mechanism is available only for 
projects located in Maryland.” 
 
Michigan  
 
In re Consumers Energy Co., No. 330675, No. 330745, No. 330797, 2017 
WL 4518895 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2017).  
  
Energy Company self-implemented a rate increase of $110,000,000.00 
above its current rates for the sale of electricity, as well as an elimination of 
customer credit. These actions raised its retail rates by $166,000,000.00 
with a return on common equity ("ROE") of ten and seven-tenths 
percent. The ALJ issued a Proposal for Decision ("PFD") recommending 
that Energy Company's overall rate of return be set at six and nine-one 
hundredths percent including an ROE of ten percent. Following the PFD, 
the Public Service Commission ("PSC") issued an order authorizing Energy 
Company to raise its rates, rejecting requests by the Attorney General and 
the Residential Customer Group ("RCG") to terminate the Advanced 
Metering Infrastructure ("AMI") system requested by Energy 
Company. The Attorney General appealed. The appellate court upheld the 
PSC's order approving an ROE of ten and three-tenths percent reasoning 
that it was lawful, reasonable, and not arbitrary or capricious; the court 
noted that such a rate was consistent with ROEs approved in other 
Midwestern states and that lowering the company's ROE would impede 
Energy Company's ability to secure financing for future investments. The 
PSC is statutorily required to consider and give due weight to all lawful 
elements necessary to determine an appropriate rate, and the court found 
that it acted consistently with its statutory authority. The court also held that 
the installation of a smart meter on a customer's home did not violate the 
customer's rights under the Fourth Amendment because Energy Company 
was not a state actor, reasoning that the Fourth Amendment applies 
only to government actions.  
 
Missouri  
 
Matter of Application of Laclede Gas Co. to Change Its Infrastructure Sys. 
Replacement Surcharge in Its Missouri Gas Energy Serv. Territory v. Office 
of Pub. Counsel, No. WD 80544, 2017 WL 5574857 (Mo. Ct. App. Nov. 
21, 2017). 
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Public Counsel appealed an order from the Missouri Public Service 
Commission (“Commission”) granting Gas Company, a public utility gas 
corporation, an increase in existing infrastructure system replacement 
surcharges imposed on its and Missouri Gas Energy’s service territories. 
Gas Company successfully sought increased surcharges from Commission 
to recover costs of temporary plastic mains and service lines installed as 
patches in association with the replacement of existing deteriorating cast 
iron and unprotected steel gas infrastructure systems. Public Counsel 
objected to the recovery of costs by an increase in the surcharges. Public 
Counsel alleged that the replacement costs were not eligible for an increase 
under state law because the plastic service lines being replaced were not 
worn out or deteriorated and their replacement was not done to comply with 
government-mandated safety requirements as the law mandates. Gas 
Company initially argued, and Commission agreed, that the plastic service 
lines were installed as an integral component to temporarily extend the life 
of the deteriorating cast iron and steel systems while entire systems were 
being replaced and was thus eligible for a surcharge increase. The court 
noted that no party claimed that the plastic service lines where in a worn out 
or deteriorated condition, a condition that the law mandates and is narrowly 
interpreted in order to be eligible for a surcharge increase. As such, the 
court found that a surcharge increase to recover costs associated with the 
replacement of the plastic service lines did not meet the conditions stated in 
the plain language of the state law. Therefore, the court reversed the 
Commission’s order.  
 
Tennessee 
 
B&W Pipeline, LLC v. Tenn. Regulatory Auth., No. M2016-02013-COA-
R12-CV, 2017 WL 5135977 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2017). 
 
Utility proposed to Authority a rate increase pertaining to the supply of gas 
to three counties. In determining the base rate, Utility contended that the 
investment made in purchasing the pipeline and wells, totaling over 
$2,600,000.00 should be included as a reasonable estimate of the original 
cost of the pipeline. Authority denied the inclusion of the purchase price of 
the pipeline and wells, instead relying on a 2008 tax return as the more 
accurate measure of the pipeline’s original depreciated cost. Finding that 
the purchase of the pipeline and wells cost less than the value to repair 
existing infrastructure, Authority set the cost of the equipment as reflected 
in the tax forms, lowering the cost to Utility to $854,000.00. This lower 
cost to Utility therefore did not justify the substantial rate increase to be 
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passed onto customers, and the increase was denied by Authority. On 
appeal, the court of appeals upheld the base calculation, finding no abuse of 
discretion or public policy considerations that would justify overturning 
Authority’s decision. 
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SELECTED TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS DECISIONS 
Bankruptcy 
 
D. Delaware  
In re La Paloma Generating, Co., Case No: 16-12700 (CSS), 2017 WL 
5197116 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 9, 2017).  
Company owns a natural gas-fired electricity plant. Operation of this 
facility includes the release of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. In 
2015, the facility had emissions of 2,0678,035 metric of tons of carbon 
dioxide. Emissions of gas have continued at the same rate in 2016 and 
2017. Company satisfied all of its obligations required by regulation. On 
December 6, 2016, Company filed a voluntary petition with the court for 
relief under chapter 11. Company plans to sell all of its assets, but at issue 
here is whether or not it can sell the assets without surrendering compliance 
instruments under the California Cap-and-Trade Program. Company argues 
that it can sell its assets free and clear of all interest under the bankruptcy 
code, whereas California Air Resources Board (“CARB”) argues that it’s 
interest – the compliance instruments – in the assets, including the electric 
plant, does transfer to the successor owner. The court held that neither the 
bankruptcy code nor State law imposes such successor liability, therefore, 
Company can sell the plant without surrendering the compliance 
instruments for greenhouse gas emissions.    
 
E.D. Missouri 
 
In re Peabody Energy Corp., No. 16-42529-399, 2017 WL 4843724 
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. Oct. 24, 2017). 
 
Energy Company sued seeking an order enjoining City and Counties from 
prosecuting their complaints and requiring them to dismiss those actions 
with prejudice after Company successfully filed for relief under Chapter 11 
of the Bankruptcy Code. Alleging that Energy Company’s behavior was 
responsible for various types of climate-change-related damage in 
California, City and Counties asserted eight causes of action—one count of 
public nuisance on behalf of citizens of the state of California, and the 
following seven counts on behalf of residents of City and Counties: (1) 
public nuisance, (2) strict liability for failure to warn, (3) strict liability for 
design defect, (4) private nuisance, (5) negligence, (6) negligence for 
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failure to warn, and (7) trespass. The crux of this action was the 
interpretation of the Plan and Confirmation Order Provisions set forth by 
the court in the bankruptcy action, which was negotiated extensively 
between Energy Company and several government agencies. The EPA 
added clarifying terms which City and Counties contended altered the 
agreement in a fashion that allowed their claims to continue. The district 
court found that: (1) because City and Counties were aware of Energy 
Company’s bankruptcy case and failed to file proof of claims or otherwise 
participate in that action, they failed to establish any “pre-petition” claims, 
and their current claims should be discharged; (2) none of City and 
Counties asserted claims fell within the exceptions to the discharge of the 
EPA provisions; and (3) the first cause of action on behalf of all citizens of 
California constitutes a “claim” as defined in the Bankruptcy Code because 
the relief it sought was clearly enumerated in the Code. 
 
N.D. Texas  
 
In re Aeon Operating, Inc., No. 15-33935-hdh7, 2017 WL 4457437 (Bankr. 
N.D. Tex. Oct. 3, 2017). 
 
Debtor filed suit against Oil Companies, seeking the avoidance and 
recovery of certain prepetition transfers as either fraudulent transfers or 
preferences. Alternatively, Debtor sought recovery against Oil Companies 
for breach of contract. Debtor is an oil and gas operator responsible for both 
production, sales, and expenses associated with the production of the 
relevant wells. Oil Companies own a working interest in the relevant wells 
through a Purchase and Sale Agreement (“PSA”). Debtor filed for 
bankruptcy under chapter 7 several months after the PSA interest 
transferred. In conjunction with the PSA, several wire transfers occurred 
through a revenue sweep prior to Debtor’s bankruptcy filing. At the time of 
the revenue sweep and the related wire transfers, Debtor was insolvent. The 
court held that, pursuant to Bankruptcy Code, the revenue sweep was an 
avoidable fraudulent transfer because Debtor received “less than a 
reasonably equivalent value in exchange and was insolvent on the date of 
such transfer.” Similarly, the court held the first wire transfer as an 
avoidable fraudulent transfer. Unlike the first wire transfer, the second wire 
transfer was made for the benefit of a creditor related to an antecedent debt, 
which enabled the creditor to receive more than it would in a chapter 7 
filing. Because Oil Companies did not present evidence for an ordinary 
course of business defense under Bankruptcy Code, the court held the 
second wire transfer as an avoidable preference pursuant to Bankruptcy 
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Code. In regard to Debtor’s breach of contract claim relating to the PSA 
between Oil Companies, the court found the claim lacking because Debtor 
was neither a party nor an intended third party beneficiary to the PSA.  
 
S.D. Texas  
 
In re Montco Offshore, Inc., NO: 17-31646, 2017 WL 4417588 (Bankr. 
S.D. Tex. Oct. 3, 2017). 
 
In 2015, Creditors filed an involuntary chapter 7 bankruptcy petition 
against Offshore Operation Company (“Debtor”), which subsequently 
entered into a Contract with Service Company. In performing under the 
Contract, Service Company alleged that it encountered wells, equipment, 
and structures undisclosed in the Contract, requiring it to perform 
substantial unanticipated work, but Debtor refused to pay Service Company 
for the additional work. In 2017, Service Company filed its own Chapter 11 
bankruptcy petition and filed an adversary proceeding seeking to recover 
amounts due under the Contract. Debtor filed motions to dismiss Service 
Company’s amended complaint. As a result, the court found that Service 
Company’s declaratory judgment claim added nothing to its existing breach 
of contract claims against Debtor, in both, alleging that Debtor failed to pay 
for services it completed pursuant to the Contract. All such breach of 
contract claims, with the exception of one, were dismissed. Thus, Count VI 
of Service Company’s amended complaint was moot or would add nothing 
beyond the breach of contract claims. Accordingly, the court dismissed 
Service Company’s amended complaint.  
 
Other Issues  
 
N.D. California  
 
California v. United States Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 17-cv-03804-EDL, 
No. 17-cv-885-EDL, 2017 WL 4416409 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2017). 
 
California and New Mexico, together with a coalition of conservation and 
tribal groups (“Coalition”), sued the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) 
and others for violating the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) when 
BLM sought to postpone certain compliance dates for a rule after the rule’s 
effective date had passed. The Waste Prevention, Production Subject to 
Royalties, and Resource Conservation Rule (“Rule”) was designed to help 
reduce methane emissions by limiting flaring and venting of natural gas on 
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federal and tribal lands. BLM issued a notice of postponement of January 
17, 2018 compliance dates, and the district court ruled that BLM had acted 
outside its authority to postpone the “effective date” of a rule under the 
APA. The court rejected BLM’s argument that “effective date” in the APA 
also encompassed compliance dates and found that BLM had violated the 
APA’s notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements. The court ruled that 
BLM’s postponement of the compliance dates was arbitrary and capricious 
because it considered only the Rule’s costs to the oil and gas industry and 
ignored the Rule’s benefits, such as decreased resource waste, air pollution, 
and enhanced public revenues. Therefore, the court vacated the 
Postponement Notice and held that BLM violated the APA when it issued 
the notice. This case has since been appealed, but there is no decision from 
the higher court as of publication. 
  
W.D. Wisconsin  
 
Larchmont Holdings, LLC v. N. Shore Servs., LLC, No. 16-cv-575-slc, 
2017 WL 5197415 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 9, 2017).  
 
Buyer agreed to pay Seller $4,000,000.00 on a land contract for 300 acres 
of wooded land in Wisconsin. Buyer intended to set up a frac sand mine 
that it hoped would reap millions in yearly profits. However, the mining 
operation never progressed and left Buyer past due on installment 
payments. Buyer brought this action and asserted seven different claims for 
relief: (1) fraudulent inducement; (2) frustration of purpose; (3) unjust 
enrichment; (4) reformation; (5) breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing; (6) illusory contract; and (7) breach of contract. 
Seller counterclaimed for strict foreclosure of the contract and for breach of 
the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. Seller sought summary 
judgment on its strict foreclosure counterclaim and on all seven of Buyer’s 
claims. In response, Buyer raised several affirmative defenses, including 
laches, equitable estoppel, and unclean hands. The court granted in part and 
denied in part Seller’s motion for summary judgment. The court denied 
Seller’s motion for summary judgment with respect to the counterclaim for 
strict foreclosure, but only to the extent that Buyer may proceed on the 
affirmative defenses of laches, equitable estoppel, and unclean hands, 
because Seller never mentioned Buyer’s affirmative defenses. The court 
granted Seller’s motion in all other aspects. 
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Delaware  
 
Mooney v. Pioneer Nat. Res. Co., No. N17C-01-225 RRC, 2017 WL 
4857133 (Del. Super. Ct. July 27, 2017). 
 
Investor sued Producer for fraudulent misrepresentation of financial 
performance. Investor invested in securities of Producer and suffered a 
financial loss after a partial divesture of his position. As a result, Investor 
claimed that Producer fraudulently misrepresented the financial position of 
the company via publicly released quarterly reports in order to induce 
investors to buy its securities. Specifically, Investor claimed that Producer 
said it was hedging via derivatives to reduce risk when it was really taking 
on risk. Producer claimed that Investor invested during a downturn in 
commodity prices and was attempting to claim fraud to recoup his 
investment. Producer moved to dismiss Investor’s claim arguing that the 
claim was not adequately pleaded with the requisite particularity. In 
determining whether Investor’s complaint met the heightened pleading 
standards required by state court rules, the court held that Investor failed to 
adequately plead a claim for common law fraud by not adequately pleading 
with particularity any of the five elements of common law fraud. Therefore, 
the court granted Producer’s motion to dismiss. This is an unpublished 
opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be consulted before 
citing the case as precedent.  
 
Louisiana  
 
Vekic v. Popich, 2017-0698 (La. 10/18/17); 2017–C–0698, 2017 WL 
4737160. 
 
Sublessee filed petition for writ of certiorari, stemming from a claim for 
settlement proceeds resulting from an oil well explosion’s damage to oyster 
leases. The Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed the appellate court’s 
decision, holding that Sublessee should have had the exclusive right to 
manage any claims for damages resulting from the oil spill, and accordingly 
should receive damages from settlement proceeds, rather than Sublessor. 
The court here disagreed with appellate court’s finding that Sublessee, who 
ultimately became Purchaser, was precluded from recovering damage 
proceeds from the event occurring prior to the official purchase. Instead, the 
court held that the oyster lease agreement between the parties included a 
provision delegating the responsibility for all claims for damages to oyster 
leases to be managed by Sublessee. The court found no merit in Sublessor’s 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss5/4
2018]        Recent Case Decisions 1289 
  
 
argument that Sublessee is a “subsequent purchaser,” and was thus 
precluded from claiming damages regarding the oyster leases. The court 
held instead that all “rights and responsibilities” were placed on Sublessee 
through the lease agreement in exchange for the rent payment before the 
damages occurred, and accordingly, the court found that the proceeds 
belong to him. Additionally, because the agreement was unclear on who 
would receive proceeds in amounts that would be in excess of the normal 
rent payment, the court found it reasonable to examine extrinsic evidence to 
make that determination. However, the court added that even without 
examining extrinsic evidence, the agreement itself pointed to the parties’ 
intent that no additional proceeds would go to Sublessor, over and above 
the amount of the rent payment. The court asserted here that the outcome of 
the claims for damages was irrelevant for these purposes, and the mission 
here was merely to exercise “contractual interpretation” to determine who 
held the responsibility to handle claims.  
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SELECTED ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS 
Federal 
 
4th Circuit  
 
Pieper v. United States, No. 16-2035, 2017 WL 5033023 (4th Cir. Sept. 15, 
2017). 
 
Residents brought action under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) for 
injuries resulting from the United States Army’s waste disposal and 
remediation practices at an active base. Residents claimed: (1) the Army 
negligently disposed of hazardous chemicals; and (2) the Army failed to 
adequately remediate the resulting groundwater contamination. United 
States moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that 
Residents were barred by the discretionary function exception to the FTCA. 
The district court granted the motion and dismissed the case, finding that 
the waste disposal and remediation decisions fell within the discretionary 
function exception because: (1) the decisions involved discretionary 
judgment; and (2) were susceptible to policy analysis. On appeal, the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the finding and reasoning of the 
district court, holding that the Army’s waste practices did fall within the 
discretionary function exception to the FTCA. This is an unpublished 
opinion of the court; therefore, state or federal court rules should be 
consulted before citing the case as precedent.  
 
5th Circuit 
 
United States v. Am. Commercial Lines, L.L.C., 875 F.3d 170 (5th Cir. 
2017). 
 
United States brought action against tugboat owner (“Owner”) after 
300,000-gallon oil spill in Mississippi River. Owner was found responsible 
under the Oil Pollution Act (“OPA”), and United States sought recovery of 
government payments made to clean the spill, as well as declaration that 
Owner was liable for all costs and damages resulting from the spill. The 
district court entered summary judgment in favor of United States, but 
Owner appealed, contending that it was entitled to the third-party defense 
under OPA or, alternatively, that it was entitled to limit its liability. Under 
OPA, a party must establish that it exercised due care with respect to the oil 
concerned and took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of the 
third party. Under an alternative section, limits on liability do not apply if 
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the incident was proximately caused by gross negligence or willful 
misconduct of or the violation of an applicable Federal safety, construction, 
or operating regulation by the responsible party, or someone acting under a 
contractual relationship with the responsible party. Upon appeal, the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s determination, holding 
that: (1) the phrase “in connection with,” under OPA, necessitated third 
party conduct that was causally or logically related to a contractual 
relationship; and (2) the phrase “pursuant to,” under OPA, necessitated that 
third party conduct be committed in the course of carrying out the terms of 
the contract. The Fifth Circuit thus found that Owner was not entitled to a 
third-party defense under the OPA, nor was it entitled to the OPA’s general 
limit on liability.  
 
9th Circuit  
 
TDY Holdings, LLC v. United States, 872 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 
Operator of an aeronautical manufacturing plant sued the United States 
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and 
Liability Act (“CERCLA”) to get compensation for costs associated with 
cleaning up soil and groundwater contamination around the plant. 
Operator’s primary client was the United States Military, and some of 
Operator’s contracts with the Military required using some hazardous 
substances which led to the contamination. Operator complied with 
remediation requirements under CERCLA. The district court found for the 
government and allocated all cleanup costs to Operator and the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. There is no dispute that 
Operator and the government are potentially responsible parties—a 
threshold requirement of CERCLA. On appeal, Operator argues that: (1) the 
district court incorrectly analyzed liability on the basis of “fault” instead of 
strict liability; (2) the district court incorrectly determined that the 
government’s status as “owner” and not “operator” is dispositive regarding 
cost allocation; and (3) the government should bear greater costs because of 
the contractual requirements of using hazardous material. The appellate 
court determined that the lower court’s “fault” analysis was not an abuse of 
discretion because “of the evolving awareness of the hazardous nature of 
the chemicals at issue, and [Operator’s] adaptation to more stringent 
environmental standards.” The district court’s “owner” vs. “operator” 
analysis was not an abuse of discretion either because of the government’s 
two-decades-long absence from the operation site. However, the district 
court did err by treating two circuit precedents as being “outliers.” 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
1292 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 3 
  
 
Specifically, these precedents were similar because in those cases the 
government also required use of hazardous substances. Ultimately, the 
court reversed by noting it would be a “180 degree departure from our prior 
case law” if it were to allocate to operator “100 percent of CERCLA 
cleanup costs that were largely incurred during war-effort production.” 
 
D.C. Circuit 
 
Mayo v. Reynolds, 875 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 
Wildlife photographers (“Photographers”) sued the National Park Service 
(“NPS”), challenging the NPS’s elk hunting program. The program sought 
to reduce elk overpopulation by authorizing recreational hunting of elk and 
a reduction of supplemental feed in Wyoming's Grand Teton National 
Park(“Park”). Photographers argued that the NPS was required to prepare a 
new NEPA analysis every year that it implemented the fifteen-year elk-
reduction program, disclosing and analyzing the unique environmental 
effects of each year's hunt. Because no such analysis was done in 2015, 
Photographers claimed that the NPS’s action violated NEPA. NPS moved 
for summary judgment. The trial court granted NPS’s motion, finding that 
NPS could rely on the 2007 Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) in 
making its annual elk-reduction decisions because that document “took the 
requisite ‘hard look’ at the potential environmental effects that might result 
from continuing the elk reduction program in the Park as a method of 
managing the herd.” Photographers appealed, and the District of Columbia 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that all the environmental 
effects seen during the years after the 2007 EIS had been anticipated and 
analyzed in the original environmental assessment and, therefore, NPS had 
no duty to prepare a supplemental or new environmental impact statement. 
Additionally, the court ruled that because an agency’s decision whether to 
prepare a supplemental environmental impact statement under NEPA 
requires substantial agency expertise, the court must defer to the agency’s 
informed discretion. 
 
C.D. California  
 
Limo Co. v. Chem. Milling Int'l Corp., No. 2:17-cv-02345-SVW-RAO, 
2017 WL 4358423 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2017). 
  
Landowner sued prior tenant, Corporation, claiming that Corporation 
violated Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
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Liability Act (“CERCLA”) regulations and caused contamination, health 
hazards, and damage to Landowner’s property. In this suit’s procedural 
history, the district court granted the motion for default judgment that is the 
subject of this case because procedural requirements for default judgment 
were met. The court relied on factors laid out in case law, used to determine 
when it is appropriate to grant default judgment. Using these factors, the 
court determined that, first, there would have been no other recourse for 
remedy in this case, so there was a high possibility of prejudice. Second, 
evaluating the merits of the case, the subject site met CERCLA’s definition 
of “facility,” and strict liability was imposed as a result of Corporation’s 
actions. Further, a remedial compensation lawsuit was authorized under the 
California Hazardous Substances Account Act (“Act”). Therefore, 
Landowner was authorized under the Act to pursue responsible parties who 
have caused damage, and could hold them liable for “past and future 
response costs” via declaratory decree. Since Corporation was a tenant and 
held a duty not to damage the subject property, but instead caused 
groundwater and soil contamination which depleted the property of its 
proper use, Landowner’s negligence, nuisance and waste claims were each 
meritorious. Likewise, the ongoing nature of the contamination reflected an 
ongoing trespass. Since there had been no contest, or even appearance by 
Corporation, and therefore no explanations or additional evidence given in 
defense, the court found that the grant of default judgment was allowable. 
All factors considered supported granting of default judgment in this case.  
 
D. Idaho  
 
FMC Corp. v. Tribes, No. 4:14-CV-489-BLW, 2017 WL 4322393 (D. 
Idaho Sept. 28, 2017).  
  
Company operated a phosphorus production plant on 1,450 acres of 
property that it owned which lied mostly within a Tribal Reservation. Its 
operations produced twenty-two million tons of waste products that were 
stored on the Reservation in twenty-three ponds; the waste was radioactive, 
carcinogenic, poisonous, and likely to persist for decades with no safe 
method to move it off-site. The EPA declared the site a Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) 
Superfund clean-up site and charged Company with violating the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"). To avoid litigation over the 
RCRA charges, Company negotiated with the EPA over a consent decree 
with the condition that Company had to obtain Tribal permits for work it 
would do on the Reservation under the Consent Decree. Tribe demanded 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
1294 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 3 
  
 
$100,000,000.00 for the permits, or would drop the fee to $1500,000.00 a 
year if Company consented to Tribal jurisdiction. Company consented to 
get the lower permit fee and subsequently challenged the fees by showing 
evidence that the stored waste had caused no harm and that the EPA's 
containment program got rid of any need to impose substantial fees. Tribe 
produced evidence that the waste was severely toxic, and the Tribal 
Appellate Court issued a judgment against Company requiring them to pay 
the annual fee of $1,500,000.00. Company appealed and brought the issue 
to the federal district court of whether Tribe could enforce the 
judgment. The court found that Tribe had jurisdiction over Company based 
upon Company's consent and the catastrophic threat Company's waste poses 
to Tribal governance, cultural traditions, and health and welfare. The court 
reasoned that the recognition and enforcement of tribal judgments in federal 
court rests upon principles of comity. This case has since been appealed, 
but there is no decision from the higher court as of publication. 
 
Pinnacle Great Plains Operating Co. v. Swenson, No. 1:17-cv-00120-DCN, 
2017 WL 4855846 (D. Idaho Oct. 26, 2017). 
 
Purchaser attempted to consolidate a prior suit with a new claim naming 
Broker as responsible party, claiming misrepresentation of the subject 
property’s groundwater and soil prior to a land purchase. In determining if 
Purchaser’s claims should be dismissed or if the claims should be 
consolidated, the district court ultimately granted Broker’s motion for 
partial dismissal of negligence claim and partially granted Broker’s motion 
for summary judgment. The court held that the cases should not be 
consolidated because to do so would hinder efficiency of the court system 
and would be an unfair burden on the Broker. However, the court did allow 
for the second case to be stayed until there was a resolution of the first case. 
The court found both sides’ arguments regarding statute of limitations 
valid, but said the date from which the statute of limitations begins to run is 
a matter for the jury. The court applied a four-year statute of limitations 
because the violations were of the Brokerage Act, not only a breach of 
contract. Despite Purchaser’s objection to the defense that the claim is time-
barred, the court said that even though Broker concealed relevant 
information, Purchaser has not asserted that it relied on Broker’s 
information to make the decision not to file. Therefore, the court 
determined that Broker could assert statute of limitations as a defense. The 
court held that the claim is not precluded because the new claim is against a 
new defendant, (not against Realty Company, party to the previous case) 
and no final judgment had been rendered. However, the court determined 
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that, since the claims derived from the “same transactional nucleus of facts” 
and that there was privity between Broker and Realty Company, (through 
their “principal-agent” relationship) these were duplicative claims and 
could not be brought separately in the same court.  
 
W. Watersheds Project v. United States Forest Serv., No.: 1:15-cv-00218-
REB, 2017 WL 4927660 (D. Idaho Oct. 31, 2017). 
 
Environmental Group sued United States Forest Service (“USFS”) for 
permitting cattle grazing near streams that contained protected fish species. 
Cattle Grazers intervened in the lawsuit. Environmental Group alleged that: 
(1) the grazing had diminished the quality of the streams; (2) the fish 
population had decreased; and (3) USFS had arbitrarily and capriciously 
allowed the destruction of the habitats that USFS had a duty to protect 
under the INFISH strategy previously promulgated by USFS. Both USFS 
and Cattle Grazers asserted that INFISH protections did not apply to cattle 
grazing operations and that even if they did, there is no demonstrated 
causation between the cattle grazing and degradation of the streams. All 
parties moved for summary judgment. The district court found that INFISH 
does apply to the cattle grazing operations, even on lower priority streams 
that do not contain endangered fish. The court also decided that USFS did 
not act arbitrarily and capriciously when it granted grazing permits and that 
Environmental Group needed to demonstrate that the grazing has caused 
poor stream quality. Because Environmental Group did not demonstrate the 
causal nexus, the court granted summary judgment for USFS and Cattle 
Grazers. This case has since been appealed, but there is not final decision 
from the higher court as of publication.  
 
W. Watersheds Project v. United States Forest Serv., No. 1:17-CV-434-
CWD, 2017 WL 5571574 (D. Idaho Nov. 20, 2017).  
 
Organization sued United States Forest Service (“USFS”) alleging that: (1) 
USFS had violated the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”); and 
(2) USFS had violated the National Forest Management Act (“NFMA”). 
Organization sought a preliminary injunction to prevent USFS from 
allowing domestic sheep to graze on the Snakey and Kelly Canyon 
allotments (“Allotments”) in the Caribou-Targhee National Forest 
(“Forest”). Organization argued that allowing domestic sheep to graze on 
the Allotments posed a risk to the bighorn sheep population due to the 
potential transmission of pneumonia pathogens. The court found that USFS 
raised significant issues regarding the likelihood of success on the merits 
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for Organization’s NEPA claim because of the potential applicability of a 
2013 settlement agreement. The court concluded that without further 
information, it could not sufficiently assess the likelihood of success of the 
NEPA claim. However, the court found that Organization’s NFMA claim 
was likely to succeed on the merits, that irreparable harm was likely, that 
the balance tipped in favor of Organization, and that the injunction would 
be in the public interest. Therefore, the court granted Organization’s motion 
for a preliminary injunction against USFS. 
 
D. Nevada 
 
Diamond X Ranch LLC v. Atl. Richfield Co., No. 3:13-cv-00570-MMD-
WGC, 2017 WL 4349223 (D. Nev. Sept. 29, 2017). 
 
Ranch Owner filed suit against Oil Company concerning the cleanup of 
acid mine drainage from a Superfund site and its surrounding areas. Ranch 
Owner claimed that its ranch was contaminated by Oil Company’s acid 
mine drainage to the point that the ranch could not be developed into a 
residential subdivision. The district court first determined that Nevada 
choice-of-law standards would control Ranch Owner’s tort claims because 
the subdivision was to be located entirely in Nevada and the diversion point 
in the creek leading to the contamination was in Nevada. The court then 
ruled on several motions as follows: (1) it granted Oil Company’s motion to 
bar Ranch Owner’s strict liability claim based on the statute of limitations 
but was denied as to the state law tort claims for nuisance, trespass, 
negligence, and misappropriation of water rights; (2) the court granted Oil 
Company’s motion for summary judgment regarding Ranch Owner’s public 
nuisance claim because in Nevada, no private right of action for public 
nuisance existed; (3) the court denied Oil Company’s motions for summary 
judgment for trespass and to limit damages based on geographic location; 
(4) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to Ranch Owner’s remaining 
state law tort claims and, thus, summary judgment on those claims was 
denied; (5) Ranch Owner was precluded from recovering costs after 
February 2012—when Oil Company included ranch in a study regarding 
the issue in contention—but Oil Company’s motion for summary judgment 
on Ranch Owner’s first Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) claim was otherwise denied; 
and (6) Oil Company’s motion for summary judgment on Ranch Owner’s 
second CERCLA claim was granted because Ranch Owner was a covered 
person for purposes of liability under federal law regarding contiguous 
properties.  
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D. New Jersey  
 
New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Amerada Hess Corp., No. 15-6468 
(FLW)(LHG), 2017 WL 4953903 (D. N.J. Nov. 1, 2017).  
  
Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”) sought to recover natural 
resource damages from Company after Company discharged MTBE, an 
organic chemical compound derived from methanol and isobutylene that 
spreads easily into groundwater supplies, into groundwater of DEP’s trial 
sites. Such contamination made the drinking water unacceptable for 
consumption, posing a risk to human health. A dispute existed between the 
parties concerning the damages to which DEP might be entitled should the 
factfinder find in DEP’s favor on its strict liability Spill Act claim, which 
sought primary restoration damages for the cost of restoring the 
contaminated groundwater at the trial sites to its condition before contact 
with human civilization. Company argued that DEP was not entitled to 
primary restoration damages because Company was already remediating the 
groundwater under New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act 
("NJDEP")-approved remediation plans. The court held that Company's 
motion in limine for leave to file a motion for partial summary judgment 
based upon the alternative burden of "a significant threat to human health, 
flora, or fauna" was not supported by good cause and thus denied. It also 
held that DEP’s burden of proof at trial on its claims for primary restoration 
damages would be to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that its 
primary restoration plan was "practicable," meaning "reasonably capable of 
being done" in light of site-specific realities. Such a standard would require 
a fact and circumstance specific inquiry.  
 
Strategic Envtl. Partners, LLC v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., No. 12-3252, 
2017 WL 4678199 (D.N.J Oct. 16, 2017). 
 
In 2010, Company bought property containing a landfill which it intended 
to develop into a solar energy farm. Company claims that from the 1950s 
through the 1970s, when the landfill accepted solid waste, Former Owners 
sent garbage containing hazardous substances to the landfill, causing 
contamination that needed to be cleaned up. In October 2011, Company 
entered into an agreement with Former Owners concerning the closure of 
the landfill and the post-closure plans for the land. It also entered into an 
Administrative Consent Order (“ACO”) with Former Owners stating that 
the parties were consenting to the ACO’s terms pursuant to the authority of 
Former Owners under the Solid Waste Management Act (“SWMA”). 
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Through the process of closing and capping the landfill, Company incurred 
extensive response costs and alleged that this high cost arose from Former 
Owners’ polluted and contaminated of the landfill with hazardous 
substances. Thus, Company argued that Former Owners were liable for part 
of the cost under the Comprehensive Response Compensation and Liability 
Act (“CERCLA”). Both parties moved for summary judgment on the issue 
of CERCLA liability. Company claimed that it discovered the hazardous 
substances on the property due to testing and laboratory measures 
undertaken in 2011 and that it should be reimbursed by Former Owners for 
the testing costs and the costs of the cleanup because of the agreement it 
had entered into with Former Owners and because Former Owners had 
polluted the landfill. Former Owners disagreed, arguing that the response 
costs were undertaken prior to the investigation and discovery as evidenced 
in the ACO and that the laboratory costs were part of Company fulfilling its 
responsibilities under the ACO. The court granted summary judgment in 
favor of Former Owners, holding that Company lacked evidence of 
incurring CERCLA response costs. This is an unpublished opinion of the 
court; therefore, federal court rules should be consulted before citing the 
case as precedent. 
 
D. Puerto Rico 
 
United States v. Puerto Rico Indus. Dev. Co., No. 15-2328 (FAB), 2017 
WL 6061011 (D.P.R. Dec. 7, 2017). 
 
Contamination was discovered in water beneath Company’s property, so 
the EPA investigated and attempted to decontaminate the water. The United 
States sought reimbursement under the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”) from 
Company for expenditures made to decontaminate the water. United States 
filed for summary judgment for the court to find that: (1) Company is prima 
facie liable under CERCLA; (2) Company is ineligible for the secured 
creditor exemption from CERCLA; and (3) Company cannot claim the 
defenses of third party fault, innocent landowner, and contiguous 
landowner later in litigation. The district court found that Company is prima 
facie liable under CERCLA because United States demonstrated that 
Company’s property is a facility, that Company is potentially responsible 
for the contamination, that a release of hazardous substances had occurred 
on Company’s property, and that United States had incurred response costs 
from the contamination. The court also found that Company was not 
eligible for the secured creditor exemption from CERCLA because to 
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qualify an entity must only have indicia of ownership of the property such 
as a creditor would have, whereas Company actively managed the property. 
The court concluded that summary judgment was not appropriate for the 
issues of third party fault, innocent landowner, and contiguous landowner 
defenses because United States had not discovered the source of the 
contamination, which was a necessary determination before the preclusion 
of defenses based on information about the source of the contamination. 
Company also filed a third-party complaint against tenants on the 
contaminated property, which the court the parties to confer upon prior to 
the next pretrial conference to set forth their positions regarding the 
complaint. Company filed a motion to defer the disposition of the summary 
judgment motion, which the court denied because no more discovery by 
Company would bear upon the issues presented in the summary judgment 
motion. 
 
D. Utah  
 
United States v. Par. Chem. Co., No. 2:09-cv-804-CW, 2017 WL 4857547 
(D. Utah Oct. 24, 2017). 
 
Trustee held the assets of a former chemical company and pharmaceutical 
corporation (collectively, “Company”). Investment Company owned 
property adjoining the Trust Property (“Property”), which it leased to a 
drywall business, and also held an easement (“Easement”) on the Property. 
Trustee attempted to sell the Property free and clear of its easement. 
However, Investment Company opposed the sale because the sale of the 
Easement would require it to relocate the business at “significant expense.” 
Investment Company argued that: (1) the United States' Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) 
lien (“Lien”) on the Property was not perfected under Utah law and, thus, 
was junior or secondary to the Easement; and (2) that the court lacked 
authority to extinguish the Easement in these circumstances. The court 
ruled that it need not address whether CERCLA preempts state law on lien 
filing requirements because the EPA sent Company a letter notifying it that 
the CERCLA Lien had been perfected by recording the Notice of Federal 
Lien with the Utah County Recorder, which complied with Utah law. 
Additionally, the court held that it did have the authority to sell the 
Easement pursuant to its authority from “the court's general equitable 
power to order sales of property within its jurisdiction on terms ordered by 
the court.” Upon these findings, the court exercised its inherent authority 
and discretion to order the sale of the Property free and clear of the 
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Easement. This case has since been appealed, but there is no decision from 
the higher court as of publication. 
 
E.D California 
 
Conservation Cong. v. United States Forest Serv., No. 2:16-CV-00864-
MCE-AC, 2017 WL 4340254 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2017). 
 
Conservation Group asserted twelve claims of relief against United States 
Forest Service (“USFS”) related to USFS’s decision to push forward its 
Lava Hazardous Fuels Reduction Project (“Lava Project”). Specifically, 
Conservation Group claimed violations of the National Environmental 
Policy Act (“NEPA”), the National Forest Management Act (“NFMA”), the 
Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), and the Endangered Species Act 
(“ESA”) challenging USFS’s decision to exclude the Gray Wolf from its 
Biological Assessment analysis of the potential effects of its Lava Project 
on certain species. Conservation Group sought permission to add fourteen 
documents exhibiting the “movement and presence of the Gray Wolf in 
California” which supported multiple of its claims. The court noted that 
under the APA, the scope of the court’s review was limited to the 
administrative record to the agency at the time of the challenged decision. 
However, this rule only applies when there is “no other adequate remedy in 
court,” and since the ESA provides a citizen suit remedy, the APA does not 
apply in those suits. The court stated that its review in context of the claims 
brought under the ESA’s substantive citizen suit provision must not be 
limited by the APA and, thus, granted Conservation Group’s motion submit 
the additional evidence. 
 
Earth Island Inst. v. Elliott, No. 1:17-cv-01320-LJO-MJS, 2017 WL 
5526572 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2017). 
 
Environmental Organization sued Forest Supervisor and the United States 
Forest Service (“USFS”) seeking a preliminary injunction to halt two 
projects to fell large swaths of dead and dying fire-damaged trees. 
Environmental Organization feared that the projects would adversely affect 
endangered and non-endangered wildlife in the area and argued that the 
circumstances required further analysis before the project could begin and 
sought to postpone it. Forest Supervisor argued that the felling project fit 
within one of three categorical exclusions to the National Environmental 
Policy Act, allowing it to go forward without further analysis than what was 
done via an Environmental Impact Statement or an Environmental 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss5/4
2018]        Recent Case Decisions 1301 
  
 
Assessment. The district court denied Environmental Organization’s 
motion. It found that: (1) Environmental Organization did not show that its 
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) Environmental Organization did not 
establish a likelihood of success on the merits for its claim that the sensitive 
wildlife species that would be affected was enough to create an 
extraordinary circumstance that made a categorical exclusion inappropriate; 
(3) Forest Supervisor was not required to assess the two projects’ effects as 
cumulative or connected; (4) on the present record, the limited scope of the 
project did not amount to a sufficient showing of irreparable harm; (5) 
Environmental Organization did not make a sufficient showing of 
environmental harm to outweigh the risk of economic harm associated with 
delaying the project; and, (6) the safety concerns attendant to a delay of the 
project significantly outweighed Environmental Organization’s chances of 
showing environmental harm on the merits, leading public interest to weigh 
strongly against the preliminary injunction. 
 
S.D. California  
 
Cox v. Ametek, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-01211-GPC-AGS, 2017 WL 4792424 
(S.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2017).  
 
Decedent's Family brought suit against Manufacturer, asserting a wrongful 
death claim related to the death of their mother ("Decedent"). Manufacturer 
used land in California to manufacture aircraft engine parts for two decades 
that was located near Decedent's residence. Manufacturer stored toxic waste 
in an underground sump beneath its property, which leaked chlorinated 
solvents and other chemicals into the groundwater and subsurface soil. This 
leak thereafter migrated into groundwater beyond Manufacturer's property 
boundary. Measurements taken in 1987 and 2007 showed that the measured 
chlorinated solvent concentrations exceeded California's "Basin Plan Water 
Quality Objectives." Several of the chemicals contained in the leakage are 
associated with serious health risks, including cancer, according to the 
EPA. In 1998, the California Regional Water Quality Control Board 
("Board") named Manufacturer a responsible party in a cleanup and 
abatement order ("CAO") that required Manufacturer to duly delineate the 
plume and comply with remediation tasks. Manufacturer chose not to 
comply with the order and ignored subsequent letters and violation notices 
sent by Board. Decedent lived directly above the groundwater 
contamination plume from 1976 until her passing in 2001, which was 
caused by a kidney tumor. In the present case, Manufacturer filed a motion 
to dismiss, arguing that Decedent's Family failed to satisfy the elements for 
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causation. The district court rejected Manufacturer's motion to dismiss 
because the complaint of Decedent's Family sufficiently states a plausible 
claim that Manufacturer's inaction caused Decedent's untimely death. The 
court rejected Manufacturer's argument that its failure to comply with the 
CAO could not have contributed to Decedent's death since Decedent had 
already been exposed to the chemicals for two decades prior to the CAO 
because a cleanup effort could have plausibly allowed Decedent to have 
lived longer because her exposure could have been lessened.  
 
S.D. Ohio  
 
Hobart Corp. v. Dayton Power & Light Co., No. 3:13-cv-115, 2017 WL 
5956911 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 30, 2017). 
 
Corporations owned a landfill site that was contaminated. In 2013 and 
2016, Corporations entered into settlement agreements with the EPA to 
remedy the contamination. Corporations then sought contribution under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 
of 1980 (“CERCLA”) from eight other Companies, alleging that the other 
Companies were also responsible for the contamination of the sight. Each 
of the Companies then moved for summary judgment on the issues of 
whether each Company used the landfill and if it did, whether it dumped 
hazardous materials in it. The district court in this case only addressed the 
first issue of whether each Company had used the landfill. In doing so, the 
court found for three of the Companies finding that they had not used the 
landfill for various reasons, and thus granted summary judgement in 
Companies favor. For the remaining five companies, there remained an 
issue of fact about their use of the landfill, thus their motions for summary 
judgement were not granted and the cases against them are proceeding.  
 
S.D. New York 
 
In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 04 
Civ. 4968 (VSB), 2017 WL 5468758 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2017). 
 
Water District was charged with maintaining groundwater quality in 
Orange County, California and alleges that the use and handling of Methyl 
Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) contaminated groundwater within its 
jurisdiction. Oil and gas companies (“Companies”) negotiated a case 
management order (“CMO”). Following the adoption of the CMO, the 
judge granted judgment in favor of Companies, dismissing all claims 
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against them based on res judicata and finding that consent judgments from 
2002 and 2005 barred claims in this action. Water District appealed that and 
the summary judgment decisions to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, 
which vacated and remanded the decision back to the district court. Water 
District also made a motion requesting an issue of a suggestion of remand 
to the judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (“Panel”) to remand the 
remaining proceedings to the another district court. In response, first district 
court found that all consolidated pretrial proceedings were complete and 
accordingly granted Water District’s motion.  
 
State 
 
California  
 
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Cal.Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife, 226 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 432 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017). 
 
Environmental Group brought a mandate petition under the California 
Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”) challenging the environmental 
impact report (EIR) and related project approvals for two natural resource 
plans for a proposed development. At trial, the court set aside the project 
approvals, ordered Department of Fish and Wildlife (“Department”) to set 
aside its certification of the final EIR, and enjoined Department from 
proceeding. The appeals court reversed. The California Supreme Court 
reversed the appellate court, holding that the EIR was deficient both 
because its finding that the project’s greenhouse gas emissions were 
insignificant was “not supported by a reasoned explanation based on 
substantial evidence,” and because its measure of protecting a fish species 
by capturing and relocating it was a prohibited taking under the Fish and 
Game Code. Following remand, the trial court entered judgment in favor of 
Environmental Group as to greenhouse gas emissions and in favor of 
Department on all other issues. On appeal, the court affirmed, holding that: 
(1) a trial court has the authority to partially decertify an EIR under CEQA 
following a trial, hearing, or remand; (2) a trial court has the power to leave 
Department’s project approvals in place after partially decertifying an EIR; 
and (3) the trial court acted within its discretion in declining to set aside all 
project approvals after court suspended project activity pending correction 
of partially-decertified EIR. 
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Washoe Meadows Cmty. v. Dep’t of Parks & Recreation, 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
238 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017). 
 
Community sought to set aside approval of a project intended to address 
environmental concerns posed by a golf course on the basis that the 
proposed plan violated the California Environmental Quality Act 
(“CEQA”). The trial court set aside the approval of the project, and the 
State appealed. The appellate court affirmed the trial court on the basis that 
the project description was not “accurate, stable, and finite” as required by 
CEQA. Instead of providing an accurate, stable, and finite plan so that the 
public may comment on the proposed plan, the State provided five very 
different alternatives which may or may not have been ultimately approved. 
Therefore, this did not give the public anything concrete to grasp which 
impaired their “ability to participate in the environmental review 
process”—something that is essential to CEQA. Presenting the public with 
such a moving target was prejudicial (showing prejudice is a CEQA 
requirement) because it was not certain that any of the alternative plan 
would ultimately be selected or approved. Accordingly, the court affirmed 
the lower court’s determination that the plan’s approval should be vacated. 
 
Michigan  
 
Michigan Dep’t of Envtl. Quality v. City of Flint, No. 17-12107, 2017 WL 
4641897 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2017). 
 
In response to public health risks associated with City water supply, the 
EPA, in January 2016, determined that the water posed an imminent and 
substantial endangerment to the public health. The EPA then issued an 
Emergency Administrative Order (“Order”) imposing requirements on City 
to improve the water conditions. Due to lack of action by City, State 
Department of Environmental Quality (“DEQ”) asked the court to order 
City to take action and brought a motion for summary judgment. 
Accordingly, the district court found that DEQ had established the 
necessary requirements for a permanent injunction to compel City to enter a 
long-term water supply contract consistent with the EPA Order. As a result, 
the court granted DEQ’s motion for summary judgment in part and further 
ordered that City choose a satisfactory long-term drinking water source 
under EPA’s Order on or before October 23, 2017.  
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New Hampshire 
 
Brown v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., No. 16-cv-242-JL, 
2017 WL 6043956 (D.N.H. Dec. 6, 2017). 
 
Landowners sued Manufacturer for economic damages after Manufacturer 
allegedly released contaminants into public water systems and 
contaminated Landowners’ properties. Manufacturer moved to dismiss the 
complaint in its entirety. First, Manufacturer claimed that the release of the 
chemicals into public systems constitutes an injury only to the groundwater, 
which Landowners did not have rights to that groundwater. The court 
rejected this argument, holding that the groundwater’s contamination could 
have reasonably led to the lost use and enjoyment of Landowners’ real 
property. Dismissal at this point in the litigation was therefore improper. 
Second, Manufacturer claimed that the lack of physical symptoms to 
Landowners’ themselves did not warrant the reward of medical monitoring 
damages. Finding that New Hampshire law was not well-adapted to answer 
this question, the court denied Manufacturer’s motion to strike the reward 
without prejudice, and is considering whether to certify the question to the 
New Hampshire Supreme Court. Third, Manufacturer claimed that the 
claim of trespass was improper, because there was no deliberate entry onto 
Landowners’ properties. The court denied this motion, because the claim 
included language that the trespass could have been negligent rather than 
deliberate. Finally, the court did grant the Manufacturer’s motion to dismiss 
any claims regarding unjust enrichment, because New Hampshire law does 
not recognize claims of unjust enrichment outside of contract law.  
 
New York 
 
Matter of Global Cos. LLC v. New York State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 
155 A.D.3d 93 (N.Y. App. Div. Oct. 26, 2017).  
 
In a case arising from a cross appeal from a judgment of the Supreme 
Court, Albany County, Applicant owned a sixty-three-acre petroleum 
transfer and storage facility in the City of Albany. In 2013, he submitted an 
application to the Department of Environmental Conservation (“DEC”) to 
modify its clean air permit under the Clean Air Act in an attempt to expand 
its crude oil storage capabilities. In 2015, DEC notified Applicant that it 
would rescind the notice of completed application (“NOCA”) and rendered 
a negative declaration under the State Environmental Quality Review Act 
(“SEQRA”). In May 2015, DEC notified Applicant that it was rescinding 
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the NOCA and intended to rescind the negative SEQRA declaration. In 
response, Applicant commenced a proceeding for declaratory judgment 
against DEC seeking a judgment: (1) compelling DEC to make a final 
decision on its permit application; (2) annulling DEC’s rescission of the 
NOCA and compelling DEC to complete its permit application review; (3) 
declaring that DEC failed to act in a timely manner and could not rescind 
the negative SEQRA declaration; and (4) compelling DEC to issue an 
amended negative SEQRA declaration. The trial court partially dismissed 
Applicant’s action for declaratory judgment. It also directed DEC to render 
a decision on the permit application within sixty days, but the court 
dismissed Applicant’s third and fourth causes of action. The appellate court, 
found that the prior court properly granted intervenor status but erred in 
directing DEC to act on the permit application within sixty days because 
DEC was authorized to rescind the NOCA and the rescission was both 
timely and rationally based. The Supreme Court accordingly affirmed in 
part and reversed in part.  
 
Vill. of Pomona v. Town of Ramapo, 64 N.Y.S.3d 80 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2017). 
 
Village was dissatisfied with determinations of Town Board on a proposed 
development project, an amendment to the Town Plan to permit the project, 
and the rezoning of the property on which the project was to be constructed. 
Village sought to invalidate the determinations, contending that Town 
Board did not adequately consider the effect of the project on community 
character or the environmental impact of the project in proximity to a 
pipeline. Village also asserted that Town Board violated municipal law. The 
trial court denied Village’s petition and dismissed the proceeding. The 
appellate court reversed, holding that Town Board did not adequately 
consider the environmental effect of the project’s proximity to the pipeline. 
 
Youngewirth v. Town of Ramapo Town Board, 65 N.Y.S.3d 540 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2017). 
  
An Individual commenced proceeding seeking review of determinations of 
Town Board resolving to approve a findings statement pursuant to the State 
Environmental Quality Review Act (“SEQRA”) in connection with a 
proposed development project, to amend a comprehensive plan of the town 
so as to permit the development project, and to rezone the real property on 
which the development project was proposed to be constructed. The county 
court denied petition and Individual appealed. The appellate court reversed 
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and granted Individual’s petition, holding that Town Board failed to take a 
“hard look” at the environmental impact of placing proposed development 
in close proximity to existing gas pipeline, that Individual did not establish 
that rezoning of property was in clear conflict with the town’s 
comprehensive plan, and that town’s change in zoning did not violate Town 
Law governing zoning districts. 
 
Pennsylvania 
 
Becker v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., No. 560 C.D. 2017, 2017 WL 5907706 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. Dec. 1, 2017).  
 
Trustee petitions from an order of the Environmental Hearing Board 
(“Board”) dismissing an appeal from the Department of Environmental 
Protection’s (“Department”) decision finding that he had rerouted a stream 
without a permit and caused water pollution in violation of the Clean 
Streams Law (“CSL”) and Dam Safety and Encroachments Act (“DSEA”). 
Trustee appealed, contending that Board erred because the channel he 
routed was not a “stream” as defined under the laws. The appellate court 
concluded that the Trustee’s channel at issue satisfied the definitions of a 
regulated stream under the CSL and the DSEA because the stream on his 
property was a channel of conveyance of surface water with defined bed 
and banks and an intermittent flow. Accordingly, the court affirmed 
Board’s order but remanded for the limited purpose of imposing an 
alternate remedy on Trustee or obtaining permission to permit the work to 
be done and coordinating enforcement of the final orders. 
 
West Virginia 
 
State ex rel. ERP Envtl. Fund, Inc. v. McGraw, 805 S.E.2d 800 (W. Va. 
2017).  
 
Residents sued alleging that a coal company (“Company”) contaminated 
their well water, even after the Department of Environmental Protection 
(“DEP”) determined that Company did not cause contamination. Residents 
sought to require Company to provide emergency, temporary, and 
permanent water replacement. After determining that Company’s 
operations affected Resident’s water supply, the circuit court granted a writ 
of mandamus ordering DEP to compel Company to provide emergency 
water and temporary replacement water until a permanent supply was 
established by Company. DEP issued an order to Company to provide water 
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replacement and an order to ERP Environmental Fund (“ERP”) to ensure 
compliance. ERP petitioned for a writ of prohibition against enforcement of 
the mandamus. The Supreme Court of West Virginia granted the writ of 
prohibition. It held that the circuit court lacked the necessary grounds to 
compel water replacement to Residents because DEP found no 
contamination in the permitted area. Furthermore, without a finding of 
contamination by DEP, there was no basis for issuing a violation. 
Therefore, DEP did not fail to perform a non-discretionary duty for which 
mandamus could be granted. 
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